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Motivation and Conceptual Idea of the Research 
Corruption is considered to be one of the most important issues and crucial barrier 
against development in developing countries. According to recent estimates, 
corruption costs annually over 5% of World GDP (United Nations, 2018). Con-
currently, the World Bank reports that 1 Trillion USD is paid annually in form of 
bribery (United Nations, 2018). Studies over the past two decades have provided 
important insights regarding the economic analysis of corruption (e.g. Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Jain, 2001; Aidt, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2006; and 
Treisman, 2007). In addition, over the past few decades, scholars have published 
literature reviews, or surveys, to analyse the contribution of empirical articles in 
the field of corruption studies (e.g. Ades and Tella, 1996; Azfar et al., 2001; 
Dimant and Tosato, 2018). Accordingly, empirical studies provided evidence that 
shows the adverse effect of corruption on country level indicators. For example, 
corruption increases bureaucratic inefficiency (Ahlin and Bose, 2007), decreases 
economic growth (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Cieślik, and Goczek, 2018), reduces 
foreign direct investments (Barassi and Zhou, 2012; Mathur and Singh, 2013), 
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increases poverty (Gupta et al., 2002), and leads to a higher shadow economy 
(Dreher et al., 2009). In this thesis, the intention is to not further extend the dis-
cussion regarding causes and consequences of corruption on country level vari-
ables; however, the negative consequences of corruption encourage researchers 
to investigate this phenomenon further from different perspectives.  
Corruption is not only economic phenomenon in a country, it can also be con-
sidered as a result – a reflection of a country’s legal, economic, cultural, and 
political institutions (Svensson, 2005). Therefore, corruption can be treated as an 
institutional dysfunctionality, and multi-faceted features should be thoroughly 
studied for proposing a solution to alleviate adverse consequences. Corruption 
could be expressed in various forms, and these forms are addressed in this thesis.  
Corruption has been defined by Merriam Webster online dictionary as “dis-
honest or illegal behaviour, especially by powerful people (such as government 
officials or police officers)”1. As this dictionary definition seems slightly narrow, 
several definitions of corruption have been proposed, and each definition 
emphasizes on specific feature of the corruption. Some definitions focus on the 
illicit nature of corruption “an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit 
for a private individual or firm” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 517), or “acts in which 
the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes 
the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001, p. 73). Scholars tend to underline the role of 
government or public officials in corrupt relations, for example, “the sale by the 
government officials of government property for personal gain” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993, p. 599), or “the misuse of public office for private gain” (Svensson, 
2005, p. 20). Other definitions highlight economic relations “monetary payments 
to agents (both public and private) to induce them to ignore the interests of their 
principals and to favour the private interests of the bribers instead” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2006, p. xiv). Transparency International, an international anti-
corruption non-governmental organization, has offered a broader definition of 
corruption – “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”2 This definition allows 
for many different faces and characteristics of corruption, and will be used as 
main definition of corruption in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Big picture: corruption between parties. Source: Authors’ illustration based on 
the Pedersen and Johannsen (2008)  
                                                                          
1  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption  
2  https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption  
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For conceptualizing corruption, it is important to identify the actors or counter-
parts involved. The primary two sides of corruption are private and public sector. 
Figure 1 illustrates five possible relationship types between, and within, parties via 
arrows. Commonly known corruption occurs between private and public sectors 
that could be from private to public and from public to private corruption, arrow 
1 and 2 respectively. Arrow 1 refers to collusion or cooperation (upward cascading 
effects); i.e., firms make the strategic choice of offering bribes for maximizing 
the expected economic gains (Martin et al., 2007; Eddleston et al., 2019). In other 
words, these could be called influence seeking relations. Firms become per-
petrators while pursuing firms’ benefits by getting involved in illegal practices 
(Ufere et al., 2012). The motivation for corruption could be that firms tend to 
receive the usual benefits of corruption such as transactional benefits which are 
smoother administrative services, or access to additional business opportunities 
e.g. via government contracts (Nguyen et al., 2016). So, illegal payments made 
by entrepreneurs are voluntary, and these payments tend to serve mutual benefits 
of the both parties. 
Arrow 2 refers to extortion (downward cascading effects) (Eddleston et al., 
2019) that public officials are deemed to be either the perpetrators which are 
initiators of corruption. Here, public officials would demand informal means to 
execute business transactions (Ashforth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008). A public 
official can easily demand a bribe as public officials have a monopoly upon, and 
discretionary power (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) over something that a bribe 
giver needs (Cuervo-Cazurro, 2016). Individuals must pay bribes as bribe givers 
do not voluntarily make illegitimate payments as their aim is to obtain government 
services that should be provided without extra informal payments (Karhunen et 
al., 2018). As a result, public officials are assumed to be active perpetrators whereas 
bribe givers are treated as victims of corruption. 
Arrow 3 refers to the corruption which happens in relations within, and between 
members of, the private sector. On the contrary to common belief, corruption is not 
limited to the a private party (an individual or a firm) that pays, or promises to 
pay, a bribe to a public counterpart (a politician or a government official, for 
instance) for the purpose of gaining an advantage or avoiding from disadvantage 
(Argandoña, 2003). Private-to-private corruption is another type of corruption, 
which has been less scrutinized by the academic society. Private-to-private cor-
ruption can be defined as representative(s) of one private establishment anti-
cipating gaining a specific benefit by proposing some reward, financial or non-
financial, to representative(s) of another private establishment (Jaakson et al., 
2019). This type of relation does not include the public sector and it functions 
because of the corrupt business culture of the country it takes place in. 
Arrow 4 refers to the corruption which occurs within, and between members 
of, the public sector. Like the private-to-private corruption, this type of corruption 
has been ignored by scholars since corruption has been approached as result of 
business-government relations. Since state owned firms (SOF) could have 
different targets than commercial targets of profit seeking companies (Shaheer et 
al., 2019), corrupt interactions may take place in different forms such as favours 
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and non-monetary reciprocities. State owned firms set organizational goals and 
managers of SOF would rely on political connectivity and would, thus, not need 
to bribe for receiving special treatment. Also, it is important to note that employees, 
including managers, would prefer to pay bribe for receiving better paid and 
powerful positions within SOF.  
Another type of relation depicted by Arrow 5, called “exit strategy,” is related 
to the process of privatization in ex-communist countries (Pedersen and Johannsen, 
2008). Once the Soviet Union collapsed, enormous privatization happened, and 
properties transferred from undermanaged and inefficient public sector to an under-
developed private sector. Alongside, corrupt public officials from the Soviet era 
had a chance to accommodate to the private sector and this inclination led to the 
creation of close network of public and private sectors. This maintains oppor-
tunities for reviving corruption relations under even newly established market 
economy circumstances.  
Actors engaged in corruption may use monetary and non-monetary means of 
exchanges. Monetary means could be either in form of payment, such as informal 
payments i.e. bribe, or other monetary benefits (such as a scholarship for a child’s 
college education), while non-monetary benefits could be favours or favourable 
publicity (Wu and Huang, 2013; Sanyal, 2005). Bribery can be defined as 
“offering, promising, or giving something in order to influence a public official 
in the execution of his/her official duties” (OECD Observer, 2000, p. 3). Further-
more, studies on corruption primarily place bribery to the center, and generalize 
bribes as representative of the whole spectrum of corruption. This can be attributed 
to the pervasiveness of bribes and that bribes are an easily identifiable form of 
corrupt practices (Soot, 2013). In this way, it should be clarified that bribery or 
more informal exchanges of gifts, was used as a primary corruption indicator 
(subcategory). Thus, bribery was mainly used as a proxy for corruption in the 
studies which constituted this thesis. 
Table 1 presents the typology of corruption based on players in private and 
public spheres and means of exchanges. The size of corruption enables us to distinct 
corruption as petty and grand corruption. Each type has its own subtypes. Low 
level corruption refers to the everyday corrupt practices, which occur between 
people and public officials, for example, traffic police and drivers. The main 
means of this kind of interaction is expected to be monetary, such as bribery, and 
often used synonyms for petty corruption such as “Low level corruption,” or “tea 
money” (Tilman, 1968, p. 439). On the other hand, bureaucratic corruption (some-
times also called administrative corruption), that is corruption in the public 
administration, takes place at the lower level or at the implementation level of 
politics (Andvig, 2000:13) and can be attributed to the petty corruption (Tanzi, 
1998). In this type of corruption, monetary payments are used as a means of 
exchange to office workers and other officials (Kubbe, 2013), such as inter-




Table 1: Typology of corruption based on players in relation of private and public sphere, 
and means of exchanges 
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on the Pedersen and Johannsen (2008). 
 
Furthermore, grand corruption consists of two types of corruption – bureaucratic 
and political corruption (BPC) and political corruption (PC). BPC is still mainly 
driven by monetary means, and actors could be heads of ministries and economic 
agents. This type of corruption could be expected to occur between levels of 
bureaucracy and politics. It would be challenging to clearly differentiate bureau-
cratic and political corruption because boundaries are not precisely apparent, 
especially in non-democratic countries (Bardhan, 2006); however, past studies 
have offered some definitions to distinguish political corruption and bureaucratic 
corruption. According to Andvig et. al. (2000), political corruption happens at the 
highest levels of political authority. In political corruption, one side of the corrupt 
transactions is political actors and politicians who are eligible to create and imple-
ment laws on behalf of the people. This type of corruption can be referred to as 
grand corruption, which involves non-monetary means (e.g. favors) or monetary 
means (e.g. large payments). It impacts to high-level policy makers (Kubbe, 2013) 
and may have huge social and political costs. 
Considering corruption is a complex phenomenon that consists of different 
players and dimensions, up to now, far too little attention has been paid to the 
private sphere of corrupt interactions such as economic agents, i.e. firms. This 
could be because corruption has been thought to be public sphere driven inter-
action. Many theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the under-
pinnings of corruption where it originated in the public sphere. Accordingly, 
investigating the decision-making process of managers on how they choose to get 
involved in corruption could be an innovative avenue of research. Furthermore, 
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studying the link between corruption and firm performance could deepen our 
understanding regarding the consequences of corruption on firm performance. In 
this way, this thesis could provide a complete picture of corruption in the private 
sphere, which starts from decision making processes prior to corruption, and ends 
with consequences on firm performance. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is 
to provide an in-depth understanding of the private side of corruption from firm 
managers’ decision-making process to the consequences on firm performance. 
Private and public sphere relation wise, this thesis will focus on primarily Arrow 
1, 2 and 3 from Figure 1. Lastly, in this thesis, representatives of the private sphere 
will be private firms and their managers.  
There are many different perspectives one should consider while investigating 
private spheres in corruption. These different perspectives could add value to the 
investigation of the private sphere in corruption relations. More specifically, in 
this thesis, I put emphasis on four distinct dimensions of the relationship between 
corruption, manager’s decision-making process, and firm performance. In particu-
lar, (a) manager’s cost benefit analysis versus moral judgements in private-to-
private corruption (Study I), (b) the role of managerial traits in private-to-public 
sector corruption (Study II), (c) the impact of bribery on firm performance in 
foreign versus domestically owned firms (Study III), (d) different types of cor-
ruption and firm performance (study IV). Therefore, each item is specific from 
the aspect of managers’ decision-making process, types of managerial personality 
traits, types of firm ownership, and their linkage with different types of corruption.  
Study I of this thesis explores business managers’ perceptions of the extent of 
bribery within their lines of business. Study I seeks also possible explanations for 
these perceptions in private-to-private corruption or corporate crime. There are 
several important areas where this study makes an original contribution. First, 
this article highlights corruption inside the private sphere or private-to-private 
corruption, which counterparts are primarily private sectors firms and was indi-
cated by Arrow 3 in Figure 1. Contrary to common belief, corruption does not 
necessarily take place during the interaction of public and private sectors, it can 
also occur between private companies, in which case it can be called a private-
to-private corruption (Argandoña, 2003). Second, this study shows bribery can 
also exist in private-to-private corruption, not only in private-to-public corruption. 
Third, managers of these firms could have different considerations and reasoning 
of bribing in private-to private-corruption, compared to private to public corrup-
tion. Fourth, data used for empirical investigation is collected in two developed 
countries, Estonia and Denmark, which have long high standings in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. This is crucial because corruption is 
not only observed in developing countries and is also a salient issue in OECD 
countries (Hessami, 2014). Study I suggests that managers perceive corruption as 
less common when they see it as a breach of their own moral judgment. The costs 
of bribing may have a less important role, whereas the benefits from bribing play 
a marginal role in the perceived extent of bribing. Figure 2 shows studied 





Figure 2: Graphical depiction of Study I. Source: Illustrated by author 
 
Several studies have put emphasis on the linkage between personality traits e.g. 
Big Five traits and anti-social behaviour e.g. corrupt behaviour (see e.g. Van 
Gelder and De Vries, 2012; Wilks et al., 2016; Pletzer et al., 2019). Accordingly, 
managers could have also personality traits which determine their business-
related actions as well as their intention to get involved in illegal interactions, 
such as corrupt practices. By using a Vietnamese small-medium enterprise dataset, 
Study II of the thesis puts managerial personality traits into the centre of the study 
and asks whether managerial traits have a role in managers’ tendency to pay 
bribes to public officials. This study draws attention to the importance of mana-
gerial traits such as innovativeness, locus of control, and risk loving traits in 
predicting likelihood of getting involved in private-public corruption. Further-
more, this study uses the interactions of these traits and the bribing tendency in 
predicting firm performance, measured by labour productivity. Findings suggest 
that managerial traits of risk loving, and innovativeness are positively associated 
to the probability of paying a bribe, while managers’ internal locus of control is 
negatively related to the probability of paying a bribe. This paper demonstrates 
that managers, who have risk loving characteristics, and get engaged to bribe 
payments, are associated with lower firm performance. It could be interpreted 




Figure 3: Graphical presentation of Study II. Source: Illustrated by author. 
 
In the analysis of the linkage between manager and corruption tendencies, Study 
I and II provide insightful research outcomes which may lead to effective policy 
implications. These studies have commonalities and differences. Both studies 
focus on, specifically, managers and their decision-making process, and present 
important insights about private sphere corruption. For observing the full picture, 
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it is crucial to reveal which factors determine managers’ perceptions and 
experiences of bribes, and how these could be related to the firm performance. 
The main differences of these studies – also their main novelties – are the use of 
corruption types, which differ from each other by the nature of relationships, 
within the private sphere and between private and public spheres. Besides that, 
Study I and II use datasets from different countries with different corruption 
levels, such as Estonia, Denmark, and Vietnam, respectively. Study III and IV 
depart from this standpoint, and further analyse the link between corruption and 
firm performance.  
 
 
Figure 4: Graphical illustration of Study III. Source: Illustrated by author. 
 
Study III seeks to examine the role of corruption on firm performance, primarily 
in the context of the type of ownership. This study responds to two research gaps 
in the literature. First, previous studies have not consensually agreed how a 
corrupt environment influences foreign investments (Bailey, 2018; Hitt et al., 
2016). Second, to date, the problem has received scant attention in the research 
literature on how corruption relates to firm performance of foreign and domesti-
cally owned firms. In addition, Study III seeks to further provide deeper insights 
by addressing corruption level of the countries where firms are operating. By 
using the fifth round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey, Study III reveals that foreign owned firms are more likely to pay larger 
bribes than domestically owned firms, while the negative size of bribe expenses 
on firm productivity is larger for foreign owned firms than domestically owned 





Figure 5: Graphical illustration of Study IV. Source: Illustrated by author 
 
As analysed in Study III, the examination of the linkage between corruption and 
firm performance may depend on the different characteristics of firms. Hence, 
Study III puts emphasis rather on the firm side by further investigating its 
performance, ownership, and location related characteristics. Study IV, however, 
focuses on the corruption side, rather than firm features. Past studies have put 
forward that the types of corruption may be related to firm performance (Harstad 
and Svensson, 2011; Seker and Yang, 2014). Corruption can have different forms 
and nature. Bargaining powers of counterparts could reflect different outcomes 
in terms of firm performance. Accordingly, by employing the fifth round of the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, Study IV distinguishes 
different dimensions of corruption such as political corruption, bureaucratic cor-
ruption, bribe experience, and perceptions, and analyses their relationship with 
firm performance. The results of Study IV indicate that political corruption and 
bureaucratic corruption have a positive relationship with firm productivity. In 
addition, Study IV revealed that perceived extent of bribe and corruption 
experience are positively related to the firm productivity. This study suggest that 
multifaceted dimensions of corruption exist, hence, policymakers should develop 
anti-corruption measures by considering these dimensions.  
 
 
Figure 6: Overview: Organization of studies in the thesis. Source: Illustrated by author. 
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Figure 6 combines studies I, II, III, IV and their respective figures, as represented 
in Figure 2,3,4,5, and presents the full organization of the studies in this thesis. 
This PhD thesis will thoroughly investigate the underpinnings of the private 
sphere of corrupt interactions. To sum up, this investigation has two main stages 
to involve corruption and the outcome of getting engaged to corruption. The 
process part can be attributed to the managers’ decision-making process and 
different considerations while getting involved in the public-private or private- 
to-private corruption and has been studied in Study I and II. The outcome refers 
mainly to the analysis of the consequences of these involvements, and endeavours 
to find answers how corruption is related to the firm performance by considering 
different corruption and firm related features. Briefly, these studies will assess 
how managers decide to be involved and how their decisions influence on the 
firm performance in private sphere of the corrupt interaction.  
 
 
Research Aims and Tasks  
In this thesis, the linkages between managers, corruption and firm performance 
have been clearly put forward, yet the quantification of the degree and magnitude 
of such linkages is rather demanding. The main challenge is the measurement of 
corruption because corruption is an illegal activity and is primarily hidden; there-
fore, gauging corruption and identifying its relationship with different variables 
has always been challenging. However, past studies have applied certain methods 
to overcome these concerns. Therefore, in my studies, I have built my corruption 
variables based on them. These measures will be discussed in more details in the 
next sections. These challenges bring new research gaps along with their interesting 
sides. In each study, I have attempted to fill these certain research gaps.  
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to provide an in-depth understanding 
of the private side of corruption interactions from firm managers’ decision-making 
process to the consequences on firm performance. Past studies have treated the 
private sphere of corruption as a victim of interaction, thus mainly the public 
sphere has received more attention than the private sphere (Galang, 2012). Never-
theless, the private sphere of corrupt relations is complex and requires thorough 
investigation. It is vital to understand what kind of internal and external drives 
lead managers to get involved in these corrupt practices (De Jong et al., 2012). In 
addition, equally importantly, it is worthy to investigate how managers’ involve-
ments in corruption could relate to outcomes in their performance. Accordingly, 
this thesis with its empirical studies sheds new light on the private sphere of 
corrupt interactions. By doing so, many distinctions and classifications have been 
made for rigorous analysis and empirical results are provided.  
In order to accomplish the objectives of the thesis, the following set of specific 




1) To synthesize the theoretical premises regarding the link between corruption, 
managers’ decision-making processes, and firm performance.  
2) To present the relevant academic literature concerning the measure of the 
corruption.  
3) To explore cross-country differences in corruption. 
4) To synthesize the empirical literature relating to the link between corruption, 
managers’ decision-making processes, and firm performance. 
a. To elaborate the link between managers and corruption 
b. To discuss controversies regarding the consequences of corruption on firm 
performance: grease or sand the wheel effect. 
c. To compare dissimilar effects of corruption based on ownership: foreign 
versus domestic ownership. 
d. To explore role of corruption types and firm performance. 
5) To provide empirical studies. (Chapter 3) 
6) To present conclusions of the studies and discuss results. 
7) To put forward practical implications. 
8) To express limitations and present new avenues for future research. 
 
The research tasks are designated for establishing the umbrella part of this thesis 
and presenting these four articles under the common context. The research tasks 
arranged for the umbrella part of thesis do not consist of tasks, such as literature 
review, research question formulation, data collection and processing, econo-
metric analysis, discussions, which have already been addressed in the studies. 
However, tasks of the studies have been demonstrated alongside with respective 
data and methodologies in Table 2. 
 
 
Research Data and Methodology 
This dissertation has evaluated different aspects of the relationships among 
managers, corruption, and firm performance. Each link requires thorough 
analysis with comprehensive and widely regarded datasets. It should be noted 
that each study has been established by using different datasets from different 
countries. 
Study I used a survey which was designed to measure the causes, extent, and 
forms of private corruption in two Northern European countries, Denmark and 
Estonia3. This survey was administered in August 2015 with 500 managers from 
both countries, i.e. the final sample covered 1000 managers. The stratified random 
sampling method was exploited to ensure an adequate number of representatives 
of private sector businesses in both countries with respect to firm size, sector, and 
                                                                          
3  The survey was inititated as part of the project “Reducing Corruption: Focusing on Private 
Sector Corruption” (HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/FINEC/4000005200), co-funded by the Estonian 
Ministry of Justice and the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme (ISEC) of the 
European Union. Data is publicly available at: http://www.korruptsioon.ee/en/node/28537 
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region. For this purpose, TNS Emor (now Kantar Emor), which was contracted 
to carry out the survey, employed business registry databases comprising the full 
population of firms in Estonia and Denmark. The position of the respondent 
varies according to the firm size. In small and medium sized firms (with 2 to 49 
employees), only top managers were interviewed. In the case of larger firms, half 
of the sample consisted of top-managers and the other half of middle-level 
managers, typically financial manager or administrative manager delegated by 
the top-manager. However, the position of the respondent did not significantly 
affect any variable under study. 
Study II exploited the Vietnamese Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise 
Survey which was conducted via survey questionnaires with firm owners/ 
managers of private manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam in the summer of 2015. 
The survey was jointly administered by Central Institute for Economic Manage-
ment (CIEM), the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the 
Development Economics Research Group (DERG) at the University of Copen-
hagen, and UNU-WIDER. The survey comprises nine provinces of Vietnam: 
Hanoi (including Ha Tay), Hai Phong, Ho Chi Minh City, Phu Tho, Nghe An, 
Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and Long An. The survey presents various 
information about firms, such as firm performance, enterprise history, employ-
ment, business environment, owner/manager background characteristics, and 
financial indicators i.e. revenues, cost, assets, and liabilities. The population of 
private manufacturing firms in the aforementioned provinces is taken from the 
two data sources from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO): (i) the 
2002 Establishment Census and (i) the 2004–06 Industrial Survey. Stratified 
sampling was used to ensure enough firms in each province with different owner-
ship forms (household enterprises, sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited 
liability, and joint stock enterprises) were sampled.  
Study III and IV employed cross-sectional firm-level data, the 5th round of 
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V), 
which was administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. High level representatives, such as 
managers from 15,500 randomly selected firms, have been interviewed across 
29 countries. BEEPS has been performed five times (1999, 2002, 2005, 2009 and 
2012–2014). However, Study III and IV employs only the fifth round, which is 
the most advanced version of survey. It should be noted that this study did not 
conduct panel data analysis due to few overlapping firms over the years and high 
variation in the survey questionnaire. This survey contains rich input for empirical 
analysis by providing information about the aspects of firms’ activities such as, 
among others, infrastructure, services, sales, supplies, competition, innovation, 
and especially, perceptions regarding business-government relations. Corruption 
related questions are produced out of these questions, and empirical analysis has 
vastly benefited from this dataset. 
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Figure 7: maps of countries covered in the dissertation. Source: Compiled by author based 
on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2018. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates all countries covered in the studies. One can say that this thesis 
covers all countries depicted in Figure 7. As shown in Figure 7, Study III and IV 
have used dataset which were administered in following countries, Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czechia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, 
Slovakia, Armenia, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Ukraine, Turkey, Tajikistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Cyprus, Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova. 
What is more, Study I have employed dataset collected from two European Union 
countries –Denmark and Estonia – while Study II used the Vietnamese small and 
medium enterprise dataset.  
The research methodology has been decided in accordance to the research 
questions. Study I has employed confirmatory factor analysis and the structural 
equation modelling estimation technique. Study II, III, and IV used various 
econometric strategies to examine links. More specifically, study II employed 
PROBIT and OLS methods to test the research hypothesis. Study III exploits logit 
estimation specification and the ordinary least squares method. In addition to 
these methods, for purpose of addressing endogeneity concerns in the empirical 
analysis, two stage least squares instrumental variable method was used. Finally, 
yet importantly, Study IV used structural equation modelling and two stage least 
squares instrumental variable methods. 
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Table 2: Overview of the research methods used in the thesis 
STUDY TASK DATA  METHOD 
I Task 1: To explore private to private corruption 
and understand business managers’ perceptions 
of the extent of bribing within their lines of 
business 
Task 2: To compare two behavioural causes for 
bribes, a rational choice theory and a cognitivist 
theory of action. 
Task 3: To quantify the linkages between these 















II Task 4: To discuss the importance of managerial 
personality traits for firms’ business performance 
Task 5: To highlight the possible link between 
managerial traits and their illegal behaviour e.g. 
their tendency to commit corruption. 
Task 6: To examine the link between 
behavioural and personality traits of firm 
representatives and bribery in the case study of 
Vietnam 
Task 7: To study whether corruption is 
associated to firm performance through 












III Task 8: To explore the relationship between 
corruption and foreign direct investments. 
Task 9: To investigate presence of 
disproportions in bribe payments of firms 
according to their ownership types. 
Task 10: To analyse the link between bribe 
expenses and firm performance  
Task 11: To study whether the country’s 
corruption level is associated to different 
performance outcomes on foreign and domestic 
firms in relation to bribe expenses. 

















IV Task 12: To discuss the importance of 
distinguishing corruption dimensions. 
Task 13: To elaborate the relationships among 
these dimensions and how they interact each 
other. 
Task 14: To examine the link between 
dimensions of corruption and firm performance. 
















Source: Compiled by author
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Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has been organized in the following way. A detailed overview of 
theoretical and empirical background for the thesis is provided in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 3 discusses the major findings of the articles, alongside with discussions, 
conclusions, policy implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
Chapter 1 has several subchapters and subsections which have crucial importance 
for building the essays in the thesis. Subchapter 1.1 introduces corruption and 
presents detailed discussion on concept of corruption which is vital for clarifying 
all corruption related concepts used in the thesis. Subchapter 1.2 undertakes the 
presentation of the classical theories, which explains corruption and corrupt 
behaviour of individuals, managers and firms. Since measuring corruption is 
complex, Subchapter 1.3 is devoted to explaining measurement related issues. 
Subchapter 1.4 provides overview of country level differences in corruption and 
underpinnings of these differences. Subchapter 1.5 is devoted to explaining 
possible links between firm performance and corruption from different aspects of 
the equation, which includes the role of managers, importance of firm ownership, 
and the influence of dimensions of corruption.  
Chapter 2 consists of four original empirical studies. Chapter 3 presents the 
discussions and conclusions drawn from the findings of empirical analysis in 
studies. Subchapter 3.1 provides policy implications by aiming to put forward 
suggestions regarding preventive measures against corruption for firms, global 
business, and country wide policy makers. Subchapter 3.2 presents possible 
limitations of this thesis and offers future research paths to the other scholars in 
field of corruption studies. 
 
 
Contributions of Individual authors 
Study I is a co-authored paper with, Krista Jaakson, Lars Johannsen, Karin. H. 
Pedersen, Maaja Vadi, Anne Reino and Mari Liis Sööt. Krista Jaakson was 
corresponding author of the paper and formulated theoretical concepts alongside 
with Lars Johannsen. Lars Johannsen, Karin. H. Pedersen, Maaja Vadi, Anne 
Reino and Mari Liis Sööt has taken part in data collection and have contributed 
to the discussion and suggesting policy implications. Gaygysyz Ashyrov was 
responsible from processing dataset and preparing dataset for empirical analysis. 
Gaygysyz Ashyrov was also responsible for empirical analysis. 
 
Study II is a solo article of author.  
 
Study III is co-authored paper with Jaan Masso. Both authors have contributed 
to articulating research objectives and questions, building theoretical and 
empirical fundamentals of study and revising the paper throughout the process of 
publication. Gaygysyz Ashyrov has undertaken tasks of searching, processing, 
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and preparing the database for empirical analysis. Both authors have contributed 
to the selecting appropriate methodology and conducting empirical analysis.  
 
Study IV is co-authored paper with Isaac Nana Akuffo. Both authors have made 
efforts to formulating research objectives and questions. Isaac Nana Akuffo 
developed theoretical and empirical background of study. Both authors have 
contributed to revising the paper throughout the process of publication. Gaygysyz 
Ashyrov has undertaken the tasks of searching, processing, and preparing data-
base for empirical analysis. Gaygysyz Ashyrov was responsible for selecting the 
appropriate methodology and conducting empirical analysis. Both authors have 
taken part in discussions, conclusions, and recommending policy implications.  
 




It is my pleasure to thank the following people, without whom I would not have 
been able to complete this 4-year journey, and without whom I would not have 
made it through my PhD degree! 
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Jaan Masso, 
who accepted to be my supervisor in the beginning of journey and provided 
enormous support during my doctoral studies. He exhibited incredible patience, 
conveyed innovative ideas and presented thoughtful feedbacks. I genuinely 
enjoyed working with Jaan. In addition, I want to thank my Master thesis super-
visor and friend Kaire Põder, for encouraging and giving inspiration me to pursue 
PhD degree in Tartu. 
I would like to thank co-authors of my papers, Krista Jaakson, Isaac Nana 
Akuffo, Maaja Vadi, Anne Reino, Lars Johannsen, Karin. H. Pedersen, and Mari 
Liis Sööt. Their valuable cooperation and efforts enabled me to complete this 
dissertation. 
Writing thesis could sometimes got boring and tiring, Eneli Kindsiko and 
Helen Poltimae were always there to cheer me up which I am glad to thank you. 
I am thankful to Priit Vahter, Urmas Varblane, Jüri Sepp, Eve Parts, Tiiu Paas, 
Hakan Eratalay, Kadri Ukrainski, Raul Eamets, Oliver Lukason for their valuable 
research advices on various instances.  
I would also like to express my gratitude my PhD thesis pre-defense opponents, 
Aaro Hazak and Anneli Kaasa, for their insightful comments and feedback, which 
enabled me to improve the thesis. Besides, I am grateful to Julia Korosteleva and 
Aaro Hazak who agreed to be the opponents at the public defense of the thesis. 
I should mention the importance of doctoral school’s activities, among others, 
writing camps and summer schools, for accomplishing my PhD dissertation 
within nominal time. Writing camps provided comfortable, peaceful and encour-
aging atmosphere to compose my articles and allowed me to acquire new friends 
and to enlarge my network. Especially, I thank group of fellow PhD students who 
24 
participated my informal “PhD pre-pre-defense” presentation and forwarded their 
comments and recommendations at writing camp in Pühajärve. I would like to 
thank to Katrin Tamm for organizing these activities and being always supportive 
to me.  
During my doctoral studies, I got a chance to develop my Estonian language 
and obtained B1 level proficiency certificate. I am grateful to Sirje Saarmann and 
Anneli Lorenz, for being very helpful, friendly and patient in practicing it with 
me. My sincere appreciation also goes to Anneli Kütt, Ülle Maidla, Tiia Haldma 
for their help with various administrative matters and many more colleagues for 
their support. 
I would like to thank my friends, especially Muhammet Madraimov, in Tallinn, 
who energized and supported me when I escaped from Tartu to Tallinn. Above 
all, I would like to thank my family for raising and supporting me throughout my 
life. Besides, I am thankful to my friends inside and outside Estonia, I always felt 
their support during my doctoral studies. 
Finally, I am thankful to Estonian and European Union taxpayers for financing 




























































































































































































































































































1 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PREMISES  
FOR THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Theories about corruption 
Different theories exist in the literature regarding corruption. While concep-
tualizing corruption, two counterparts were mentioned within the public and 
private spheres. Accordingly, the theoretical literature constituting this thesis, 
will attempt to discuss several theories and explore possible mechanisms of 
corruption which may occur between public and private spheres, and within the 
private sphere.  
Corruption and corrupt relations were explained via a lens of agency theory 
(Rose-Ackerman, (2013). Agency theory relates at least two sides: principal and 
agent. The principal is accepted to be benevolent and specifies certain pre-
ferences, which should lead to desired outcomes. Agents are expected to perform 
actions to fulfil the duties assigned by the principal. From the public sphere 
perspective, in democratic societies, the principal can be considered as voters, or 
the heads of public institutions, and agents could be legislators, bureaucrats, and 
civic servants. Similarly, if this approach is applied to the private firms, the 
principal could be stakeholders and shareholders, while agent could be managers. 
This theory claims that agents can be involved in decision making and behaviour 
that is not in line with principal’s interests (Yi et al., 2018). Hence, two dilemmas 
emerge; first, since preferences of principal and agent diverge, their interests start 
conflicting. Second, accordingly, the principal aims to ensure the agent performs 
consistent with the principal’s interest. However, monitoring would be difficult 
and costly due to information asymmetry.  
Since monitoring is costly, the principal may give freedom to the agent to 
fulfil assigned duties. Third parties, firms, or individuals may seek preferential 
treatment and desire to affect the agent’s decisions by providing monetary and 
non-monetary means of corruption. Agent may take advantage of this freedom 
and, hence, put their own interests before a principal’s interest and get engaged 
with corrupt practices. Also, these payments are expected to not pass to the 
principal’s accounts. Public could have no benefit from the behaviour of agent. 
Consequently, by time, corruption becomes a way of getting things done in 
business and society.  
The rent seeking theory of Tullock (1967) was one of the first approaches to 
enhance our understanding of corruption, and of the economic instruments 
established to model corruption with respect to relations between public and 
private spheres (Lambsdorff, 2002). This theory is useful to fill the gap made by 
the assumption of agency theory. More specifically, agency theory assumes the 
presence of the benevolent principal and the non-benevolent agent. In many 
developing countries, the principal could be also non-benevolent and may be 
involved in corruption. According to rent seeking theory, governments hold dis-
cretionary power and monopoly control over setting tariffs, licensing activities 
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(incl. importing/exporting), market regulations, and so on. These cause the inflow 
of pressure from economic agents, who seek preferential treatment, in order to 
obtain favors. Hence, these economic agents devote their resources to influence 
public officials to capture these contestable rents. Therefore, public officials’ 
decisions could be changed to be in favor of specific economic agents who could 
enjoy rents at cost of public interest. These actions are called rent-seeking activities. 
Rent seeking activities encompass unproductive use of resources and result in a 
social loss (Aidt, 2016).  
Even though the differences are slightly vague, rent-seeking activities could 
be legal and illegal. Legal activities are often referred to as lobbying activities. 
For instance, trade unions or private firms could affect public figures by providing 
financial supports to their political campaigns ahead of elections in exchange of 
future rent extractions. On the other hand, illegal activities are often attributed to 
corruption in form of a bribe. For example, a public decision maker could receive 
benefits from influence seeking activities of rent-seekers in the way of a costless 
income transfer – a bribe (Aidt, 2016). Hence, one can call rent-seeking activity 
as corruption if competition for preferential treatment is limited to a few insiders 
and influence seeking expenses are valuable to public officials (Lambsdorff, 
2002). In addition to the assumed social loss of rent-seeking activities, corruption 
could create massive adverse welfare effects and social loss by encouraging 
introduction of redundant and inefficient bureaucratic rules (Lambsdorff, 2002). 
Eventually, it may lead to a distorted institutional structure and an underdeve-
loped business environment.  
Another line of theories has highlighted factors that are associated with an 
individual’s tendency to commit corrupt activities. Cost and benefit considera-
tions of individuals have been argued to be an important determining factor in 
engaging acts of corruption. Economic theoretical foundations behind corrupt 
behaviour rooted to the late 1960s with the rational choice theory of Becker (1968). 
The primary assumption of this theory is that individuals are rational, and they 
are capable of calculating the possible consequences of their actions by weighting 
their benefits and costs. According to the rational choice theory, individuals can 
view corruption as an opportunity for private gain. Individuals are more likely to 
get involved with crime if the expected benefit exceeds the expected gain from 
alternative legal opportunities (Dickel and Graeff, 2018). People can weigh the 
expected benefits from illegal action i.e. corruption and the expected costs, such 
as the likelihood of being caught and possible adverse consequences of penalty. 
From this point of view, rational individuals engage to the corrupt activities since 
they anticipate maximization of the subjective expected gain for their accounts. 
This approach can be applicable to actors in both public and private spheres. 
Public officials in government and managers in private firms could engage in 
corrupt activities by making cost-benefit analysis.  
However, rational choice theory has often failed to offer an adequate 
explanation for corrupt behaviour (e.g. Jaakson et al., 2019). Alternatively, the 
cognitivist theory of action, an extended version of rational choice theory, was 
offered to explain an individual’s engagement in corruption. In contrast to rational 
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choice theory, the cognitivist theory of action adds individual moral judgment to 
costs and benefit consideration as an important driving factor in corruption tenden-
cies. Previous studies have emphasised the importance of personal moral judg-
ment in predicting corruption (see e.g. Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). For 
example, Gorsira et al. (2018) suggested that norms, and the perceived opportunity 
to comply, are main driving factors in predicting corruption. Consequently, 
managers’ economic considerations, cost and benefit considerations, plus moral 
judgements, have a prominent function in explaining their involvement to acts of 
corruption. 
To better understand the mechanisms of corruption in the private sphere, 
several theories have addressed the plausible effects of the surrounding, in 
particular, institutional setting where private firms are situated and operate. 
Political economists have shown that the role of institutions should not be dis-
regarded. Role of institutions is assumed to be a crucial element in understanding 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Gupta and Abed, 2002). Accordingly, insti-
tutional theory is widely used to explain firms’ tendency towards corruption and 
their corruption behaviour (Misangyi et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Pillay 
and Kluvers, 2014; Van Vu et al., 2018). This theory is accepted as one of the 
most prevalent perspectives in transitional economies (e.g. Hoskisson et al. 2000; 
Wright et al. 2005). The institutional approach suggests that firms may get involved 
in illegitimate practices, or corruption, to not only increase the efficiency of the 
firm. Because firm could desire to play according to the “rules of the game” and 
to join an established game hence can facilitate their survival in their environment 
(North 1990, Nguyen et al., 2016; Van Vu et al., 2018). In other words, corruption 
or bribery have already become crucial parts of society, and the “rule of the game” 
in the business environment. Following rules are assumed to be vital for carrying 
business and could create pressure on firm’s operations.  
According to the neo-institutional theory, the firm’s business environment 
applies certain pressures that will induce firm to adapt corrupt practices for the 
firm to remain competitive and survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Rosenz-
weig and Singh, 1991; Nell et al., 2015; Chan and Ananthram, 2018). For instance, 
when a rival firm pays a bribe, this could put pressure on competing firms to 
exhibit similar behaviours. These pressures are called “institutional isomorphism” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). It can be different internal or external pres-
sures which can have possible effect on an organization to shape its purposes and 
roadways (Chan and Ananthram, 2018). Institutional isomorphism was divided 
into three types: (i) coercive isomorphism, for example, pressures from political 
bodies and unions; (ii) mimetic isomorphism, such as best practices that force 
organizations to conform i.e. pressure from competing companies; and (iii) 
normative isomorphism, for instance professional norms set by various profes-
sional bodies (Chan and Ananthram, 2018). Firms operating in transition countries 
may be subject to pressures from political, legal, socio-economic systems, business 
cultures, and cultural norms, and hence, may engage in corrupt activities. 
Transaction cost economics can be another approach to explain firm behaviour 
in corrupt business environments. In international business literature, this theory 
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has been widely used to explain obstacles, such as corruption for firms in corrupt 
host countries. Transaction costs occur because there are information asymmetries, 
imperfect contracting, asset specificity, and opportunism in market (Williamson, 
1975, 1985). Transaction costs can be identified by examining the specificity of 
assets in an economic transaction, and the secondary use of such assets, and the 
capability to propose contracts that inhibit opportunism in situations of imperfect 
and asymmetric information (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Based on this view, firms 
with inadequate information about business environments, may be exposed to 
higher costs of corruption as corruption increases the transaction costs of working 
in a different country, because corruption creates unpredictability in the inter-
action between the company and the government. If a firm runs business in a 
corrupt country, costs of operations may upsurge since a firm has to transfer 
informal payments to obtain public services and spend time and resources on 
dealing with corrupt public officials. Moreover, corruption could cause an unpre-
dictable and risky future if corruption is arbitrary in the country (Rodriguez et al., 
2005). In this situation, corruption is organized in a way that paying one official 
may not solve the problem. Hence, firm managers need to find powerful and right 
official to bribe who can ensure that bribe facilitates or helps to overcome rigid 
bureaucratic barriers. According to North (1990), institutions are understood as 
the set of rules in a society and can play key role in the determination of trans-
action costs. Consequently, good institutions can diminish transaction costs by 
facilitating contracting and the enforcement of contracts. 
 
 
1.2 Cross-country differences in corruption:  
role of culture, institutional setting, and social norms 
In the previous subsection, several theories aimed to explain crime and corrupt 
behavior through perspectives of economics and the political economy. Although 
their explanatory power of corruption is significant, one should bear in mind that 
corruption can exist in all countries, and its persistence and extent could depend 
on a country’s cultural background, institutional setting (incl. formal and informal 
institutions) and other country-specific conditions. Cross-country differences of 
corruption perceptions might be attributed to differences in culture, institutions 
and other country specific conditions. 
Societies might describe corruption in different ways, and these descriptions 
could reflect their attitudes toward corruption. Indeed, the description of corruption 
could vary from country to country due to cultural differences (Cuervo-Cazurro, 
2016). Thus, metaphors used for describing corruption may depict different 
meanings based on differences in people’s attitudes (Tillen and Delman, 2010): 
in some countries, a bribe is defined as a money for food and drink, like pot-de-
vin (a glass of wine) in France, chaqian (tea money) in China, gasosa (soft drink) 
in Angola, mordida (a bite) in Mexico, ashaan ash-shay (something for your tea) 
in Egypt, or finjaan ‘ahwa (a cup of coffee) in Syria. In some cases, bribe is 
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expressed as an insignificant violation, spintarella (a little push) in Italy, fakelaki 
(a little envelope) in Greece, or kitu kidogo (small things) in Kenya. In other 
countries, a bribe is pictured as a smoother of relationships and payments, for 
instance kenopenz (oil money) in Hungary, spicken (to lard) in Germany, or 
grease money in the US. Some uses refer to the illegality and hidden charac-
teristics of bribes, for example, pod stolom (under the table) in Slovakia; noemul 
(giving goods in secret) and gum eun don (black money) in Korea; or kuroi kiri 
(black mist) in Japan while countries refer to the gift exchanges for bribe, such 
as ttokkap (rice cake expenses, small gifts of cash in envelopes during major holi-
days) in Korea; or hong bao (red envelopes containing cash gifts) or “enhanced” 
moon cakes (fall festival sticky rice cakes) in China. Accordingly, different inter-
pretations and views towards bribes across countries suggest that a single defini-
tion of corruption would not be valid for all countries.  
A number of studies have postulated a link between cultural dimensions and 
perceived corruption in different countries by using Hofstede’s measures of 
cultural values (Baughn, 2010). For example, Getz and Volkema (2001) found 
that power distance and uncertainty avoidance are positively related with corrup-
tion. Higher power distance in society would mean that checks and balances are 
not adequate enough to monitor the activities of power holders. It could even-
tually indicate that power holders can easily accumulate illegal wealth through 
corruption. Furthermore, one explanation for the positive link between uncer-
tainty avoidance and corruption would be that corruption would help to eliminate 
or reduce uncertainty, and people would prefer to commit acts of corruption to 
avoid any uncertainty. In other words, in a high uncertainty avoidance society, 
people may tolerate corruption if corruption can help to overcome ambiguity and 
uncertainty. In another study, Sanyal (2005) reported that high power distance 
and high masculinity in a country are more likely to be linked to high levels of 
bribery. In the same way, a masculinity level in country has a statistically signi-
ficant positive impact on the likelihood of bribe payouts by firms (Chen et al., 
2008). The importance on material success in masculine societies has been 
claimed to lead to a tendency to get involved in corrupt practices (Husted, 1999; 
Baughn, 2010). Finally, Yeganeh (2014) revealed that Hofstede’s high-power 
distance, high uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity and collectivism dimen-
sions are positively related to corrupt behavior. Since collectivism refers to a high 
level of integration of members into strong cohesive groups, and a high inter-
dependence between the members of society (Debski et al., 2018), people may 
get involved to corruption to enhance the well-being of members by ignoring 
illegality of corruption. Consequently, one may say that cultural dimensions matter 
for corruption, and cultural difference could play a prominent role in studying 
corruption which should not be ignored. 
Despite studies’ stress on the role of culture in predicting corruption, some 
studies challenge these arguments. For example, by using the Bayesian Model for 
averaging data across 123 countries, Jetter and Parmeter (2018) underscore the 
importance of institutional characteristics in driving corruption, whereas cultural 
attributes remain virtually (statistically) meaningless. In their study, institutional 
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determinants include, among others, the rule of law, property rights, and the 
political rights; while cultural determinants contain, among others, the share of 
Protestants in society, ethnicity, language, and religious fractionalization rates 
(Jetter and Parmeter, 2018). To date, several studies have studied the relationship 
between corruption and institutional quality (see e.g. Dreher et al., 2009; 
Bjørnskov, 2011). Dreher et al. (2009) found that a better institutional quality 
decreases corruption. Institutional settings differ from country to country, and 
these differences may impact the outcome of corruption. For example, some 
empirical studies have revealed the positive link between corruption and firm 
performance, and this positive link is usually attributed to the country’s poor 
institutional quality and weak law enforcement (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; 
Méon and Weill, 2010). 
Another stream of studies has highlighted the importance of social norms in 
explaining corruption and its persistence. Social norms are notably defined as 
“shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden 
within a society” (Ostrom 2000, pp. 143–144). Individuals may feel embarrass-
ment, anxiety, guilt, and shame once they violate social norms, while they feel 
positive emotions once they follow and obey these social norms (Elster, 1989). 
One may expect that individuals adjust their behaviors by considering social 
norms; therefore, individuals may be under influence of social norms while com-
mitting crime which violates rules, such as corruption (Fisman and Miguel, 
2007). Because social norms could be perceived as informal rules that direct 
human behavior, including corruption (Köbis et al., 2018). Besides, individuals 
may signal their social norms, which they grow up with, via their interaction with 
people and their action outside of their society. For example, Fisman and Miguel 
(2007) have empirically investigated the link between corruption and social 
norms. Their results show that home country social norms regarding corruption 
(authors called corruption norms) can be significant predictor of the corrupt 
behavior in another country. However, their study also points out that strength of 
legal enforcement may reduce the effects of norms on corruption. 
Social norms could be related to the firms’ involvement to corruption via social 
interactions which may apply their impact on firms via the manager’s behaviour 
and actions within the firm (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Accordingly, their social 
connections may also influence the strategic choices of firms (Peng and Luo, 
2000). Managers’ social ties could be an important determinant of their attitudes 
and propensity towards corruption. For example, Collins et al. (2010) found that 
business executives, who have strong social ties with public officials, are more 
likely to be involved in acts of corruption. Social relationships may impose obli-
gations on managers, which may induce them to follow “the rules of game.” Hence, 
one may say that private firms could also take guidance of social norms and 
informal rules. In societies where maintaining corrupt relations is a way of doing 
business, firms would prefer to have these relations to avoid any disruptions in 
their business.  
In addition to the relevance of cultural background and institutions to corruption 
levels, some studies draw attention to the link between corruption and the 
32 
communist background of the countries. Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) have 
found that communism and post-communism increase the levels of corruption. 
An explanation for this finding is that communism established structural incentives 
for practicing acts of corruption, which turned out to be such a prevalent fact of 
life that they embedded in the culture of these societies (Sandholtz and Taage-
pera, 2005). As an evidence, over the years, post-communist countries have been 
ranked as very corrupt countries in the widely used Corruption Perception Index. 
Therefore, post-communist countries have struggled to improve underdeveloped 
institutions in order to undertake anti-corruption reforms; however, with few 




1.3 Measures of corruption 
Different methods and sources have been proposed to measure corruption. Table 
3 demonstrates a list of databases which have extensively been used in corruption 
research. Some organizations produce measurements of corruption levels across 
countries primarily based on expert opinions. Experts gather information, pay 
attention to recent news, events, and corruption cases for determining corruption 
levels. One of the most prominent and widely used measures of corruption comes 
from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI); how-
ever, some studies have been very critical about the reliability of these measures 
(see e.g. Golden and Picci, 2005). The primary concern is that surveyed respondents 
may have motivation to underreport their involvement, and respondents who have 
no experience with corruption may provide inadequate information. In addition, 
since TI CPI is highly popular, it may affect people’s reporting as they tend to 
report corruption perception based on what they believe based on the recent 
version of CPI. Therefore, the actual extent of reliability of survey information 
about corruption is largely unknown (Golden and Picci, 2005). Past studies mostly 
relied on the cross-country measures of corruption based on expert assessments, 
and household and firm level surveys. For example, in post-soviet transition 
countries, the Life in Transition survey is a household survey widely used for 
examining corruption at the individual level (for example, see Korosteleva et al., 
2019). However, measuring actual corruption level is quite complicated task. Many 
scholars are critical about the measuring accuracy of the corruption experiences 
(e.g. Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014), as corruption perceptions can have weak 
correlations with actual experiences of corruption (Seligson 2006; Olken 2009; 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010; Escresa and Picci, 2017). Since corruption is 
illegal and secretive in nature, survey questionnaires can be considered as sensitive; 
therefore, respondents may not report what they experience, or what they have 





Table 3: Commonly used sample databases in corruption research. 
Dataset Organizations Sources Information 
Control of corruption, World 
Governance Indicators 
World Bank E, H, F, Perception 
Corruption perception index Transparency 
International  
E, F Perception 
Index of Economic Freedom  Heritage Foundation E Perception 
International Country Risk 
Guide  
Political Risk Services 
Group 
E Perception 
Corruption Index  Economic Intelligence 
Unit 
E Perception 
Country Policy and  
Institutional Assessment 
World Bank  E Perception 
Bribe payers Index  Transparency 
International 
F Perception 








Executive Opinion Survey World Economic Forum F Perception 
World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) 
World Bank F Perception 
The Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey 
EBRD and World Bank F Perception 
Life in Transition Survey EBRD H Perception 
Note: E: expert, F: firm, H: Household.  
Source: Updated by author based on Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010), and Sudders and Nahem 
(2004). 
 
In firm level analysis of corruption, much of the literature has used surveys which 
are developed and administered by international organizations. The joint effort 
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 
offers a survey of firms in post-communist countries, the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). This survey is one of the most 
vastly used dataset to investigate firm level analysis in post-communist countries. 
Study III and IV in this dissertation have also used this survey for empirical 
analysis. However, for a larger sample, past studies tend to use the World Business 
Environment Survey by World Bank. Measuring firm level corruption from these 
surveys is complicated, and similar perception related concerns remain valid; 
however, in order to overcome this issue, survey designs are developed in a way 
34 
that respondents are asked to speculate about their incumbents’ behaviour rather 
than reporting their own behaviour in corrupt incidents (Jaakson et al., 2019). 
Recently, some studies have proposed alternative measures or methods to 
gauge corruption. For example, Escresa and Picci (2017) have put forward use of 
the judicial statistics to develop a cross-national measure of corruption. Similarly, 
recent empirical studies have exploited judicial data on corruption-related 
offences – that is a panel of twenty Italian regions over the 1991–2010 period – 
to investigate the relationship between corruption and government expenditure. 
Despite using judicial statistics to analyse corruption seems reasonable, this 
method may not be feasible for many developing countries due to several reasons. 
First, inherent difficulties in obtaining such data; second high variations and low 
efficiency in rule of law. Eventually, researchers have to develop much more 
sophisticated and less costly methods of measuring corruption experiences. 
Similarly, Goel and Nelson (2011) have also proposed to use alternative measures 
of corruption such as average annual convictions for the abuse of public office 
(short and long run) in studying corruption in the United States of America. 
 
 
1.4 Corruption across firms: dimensions and factors 
Managers and corruption 
Before turning to the discussion on managers and their propensity towards 
corruption, it would be useful to look closely to individual level determinants of 
corruption attitudes. Previous research has established that micro level determin-
ants, or individual level factors, such as age, gender, and education, have a crucial 
function in explaining corruption tendencies, and attitudes toward corruption. By 
using individual-level data from 35 countries, Gatti (2003) found that individuals 
who are women, employed, less wealthy, and older are more averse to corruption. 
More recently, by using micro-level data from 6,600 respondents in 28 Chinese 
provinces, Fungacova et al., (2019) revealed that survey respondents who have 
higher education, belong to a higher social class, live in rural areas, and are 
members of the Communist Party of China, consider corruption less useful than 
other respondents. Accordingly, one can assume that an individual’s attitudes, 
and thus their direct or indirect involvement to the corrupt transactions, are highly 
influenced by many factors, among others, their gender, level of income, their 
party membership (or ideology), their position in societal classes, and their living 
environment.  
Past studies have provided substantial insights about individual level determ-
inants of corruption; however, when it comes to understanding corruption from a 
manager’s perspective, additional variables should be added to the models. For 
managers to be involved in corruption, there are many constraints such as internal/ 
external factors, legality, stakeholders’ interests, and there are many incentives 
such as an expected boost in firm performance (operational and financial), an 
increase in competitiveness, and so on. Hence, the dynamics of firms, or 
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organizational characteristics, could differently influence individuals while they 
are in the decision-making process. Accordingly, one should not expect similar 
variables, which are used for predicting individual’s attitudes, to be used as 
predictors in managerial level models. In addition, compared to the individual 
level determinants of corruption, managerial level determinants of corruption 
have been overlooked.  
In Section 1.1, I have already mentioned theories which aim to explain the 
rationale of engaging corruption. Accordingly, one intuitive conclusion could be 
that managers consider cost-benefit analysis and moral judgements prior to 
engaging acts of corruption. Apart from these theories, one question that needs 
to be asked, however, is whether managerial capital has a role in explaining 
involvement in corrupt practices. Managerial capital can be understood as human 
capital specific to the managerial positions (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007). It has 
been considered as vital component for firm growth (Bruhn et al., 2010). As part 
of managerial capital, managerial traits start to draw attention in predicting firm 
performance. For example, Sharma and Tarp (2018) have emphasised the 
significance of managerial capital by shedding light on the role of managerial 
personality traits for decision-making in firms. They found that innovativeness 
and locus of control are positively associated with revenue. Also, several studies 
have presented evidence that personality traits can have an influence in determ-
ining an individual’s ethical decision making and involvement in plagiarism 
(Wilks et al., 2016), workplace deviance (Pletzer et al., 2019), and criminal 
decision making (Van Gelder and De Vries, 2012). Accordingly, personality 
traits could play an important role in ethical decision making or their involvement 
to corruption. For example, Cherry and Fraedrich (2000) have revealed that 
managers with a higher utility of locus of control are less prone to pay bribes and 
put more importance on legal decision making. Consequently, managerial 
personality traits could be closely interconnected to managers’ decision to engage 
in corrupt practices. 
Furthermore, a number of studies have begun to examine the underpinnings 
of managers’ attitudes and behaviours regarding to anti-corruption measures. By 
using the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), Werner et al. (2019) invest-
igates the determinants of SME managers’ intention and behaviour related to the 
implementation of corruption prevention measures. According to findings pro-
duced by Werner et al. (2019), the SMEs’ managers’ moral obligations, subjective 
norms, self-efficacy, perceived controllability, and perceived threat of employees’ 
corrupt behaviour are positively linked to a manager’s intention to implement 
corruption prevention measures in their SME. Therefore, a managers’ decision to 
present unethical behaviour, such as corruption, and intention to implement 
corruption prevention measures in their firms are reasonably related to their own 
managerial capital, traits, and characteristics. However, the consequences of a 
manager’s engagement in corruption may have different repercussions on firm 
operation, depending on firm characteristics and corruption types. The next 
section will discuss these issues further.  
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Grease versus sand the wheel effect 
A manager’s involvement in corrupt activities raises questions regarding the con-
sequences of corruption, in particular, of their involvement to corruption, on a 
firm performance. In this context, a much-debated question is whether corruption 
is harmful or beneficial to the operations of the firm. One strand of literature 
supports the idea of the grease the wheel effect of corruption on firm performance, 
in other words, the positive effect of corruption on firm performance. This idea 
expresses that corruption can be a helpful instrument for firms to overcome 
bureaucratic rigidities and hence to enhance firm performance (Nguyen et al., 
2016). This positive association is usually attributed to the country’s poor institu-
tional quality and weak law enforcement (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Méon 
and Weill, 2010). In exchange of a bribe, i.e. cause of greasing the wheel, govern-
ment officials propose to “grease the wheels” of firm by eliminating all bureau-
cratic obstacles and rigidities. Several empirical studies have supported this 
hypothesis, however, studied countries tend to have a poor institutional setting. 
For example, Kalyuzhnova and Belitski (2019) demonstrated that corruption has 
“a greasing the wheels effect,” facilitating employment growth and sales growth 
in Kazakhstani firms. Using data from the Indonesian manufacturing industry, 
Vial and Hanoteau (2010) have revealed that corruption has a positive effect on 
output and productivity growth. By employing data in over 2000 micro, small, 
and medium scale enterprises in the Philippines, Mendoza et al. (2015) presents 
evidence that corruption “greases the wheels” of commerce for firms, specifically 
in cities with poor business environments. 
Another stream of literature emphasizes the “sand the wheel” effect of corrup-
tion on firm operations (see e.g. Méon, and Sekkat, 2005). In other words, corrup-
tion has negative effect on firm performance. Corruption can cause uncertainty, 
as firm may not be certain whether it is being requested for another bribery, or 
whether a bribery yields what is anticipated (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck 
et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Hence, corruption restrains an entrepreneur’s 
employment growth aspirations (Estrin et al., 2013), increases the costs and 
inefficiencies in economic transactions, and negatively impacts the business 
environment and eventually firm performance (Galli et al., 2018). Corruption can 
also restrain an entrepreneur’s employment growth aspirations (Estrin et al., 
2013). Several empirical studies have shown evidence of this effect from different 
regions. Gaviria (2002) reported the negative effect of corruption on sales growth 
in Latin America, while Hanousek and Kochanova (2016) revealed that higher 
than average bribery is linked with lower firm performance from Central and 
Eastern Europe countries. In Vietnam, Van Vu et al (2018) have found that bribery, 
and different forms of corruption, have an adverse impact on firms’ financial 
performance. In Uganda, Fisman and Svensson (2007) showed that bribery is 
negatively correlated with firm growth. By using longitudinal data from the 
1996–2012 period for 106 countries, Cooray and Schneider (2018) put forward 
that a decrease in corruption is related with higher levels of financial sector 
development. Accordingly, one can assume that corruption has been quite 
37 
widespread across the world, and the negative consequences of it on firm perfor-
mance have been observed in different countries. 
Having observed these two different directions, some studies draw attention 
on the situations or characteristics of the firms that may strengthen or weaken 
their bargaining power in interactions. For example, by using a dataset from 43 
countries over the 2003–2005 period, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) found that 
corruption can facilitate firm entry in highly regulated economies. When con-
sidering regulations, which tend to function as restrictions on starting a new 
business or as entry barriers, corruption may have facilitating role. This role can 
be attributed to the “greasing the wheel” effect of corruption. By employing the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys of more than 46,000 firms across 69 devel-
oping countries, Seck (2020) suggested that corruption can have the grease the 
wheel effect for infant and expanding firms, because it is related with their 
increased productivity, investment, and the chance to enter export markets whereas 
for firms in their regular activities, corruption exhibits rather a “sand in the wheel” 
effect, as it damages firm performance. 
 
 
Foreign versus Domestic Owned Firms 
The institutional quality of a host country is one determining factor of foreign direct 
investments (Ullah, & Khan, 2017; Sabir et al., 2019). Since good institutions 
have a positive impact on inward FDI to developing host countries (Lucke, and 
Eichler, 2016), bad or poor institutions may give negative signals to inward FDI 
for investing in the host country. Corruption is one of the consequences of poorly 
functioning institutions. Accordingly, one can consider that corruption level of 
the country could also play an important role in inward FDI. Relevant literature 
has not agreed on exact sign of the relationship between corruption and FDI. One 
stream of studies lends support to the negative linkage between corruption and 
foreign investments. Wei (2000) has shown that corruption reduces inward FDI 
since it functions as an additional tax on foreign investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993) and creates extra costs and uncertainties (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In the 
cross-country study by Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), the relationship between cor-
ruption and FDI has been found to be significant, and corruption has detrimental 
effects on inward investments. In an analysis of Swedish firms, Hakkala et al., 
(2008) revealed that Swedish firms were less prone to invest in countries where 
corruption is widespread. Furthermore, magnitude of the adverse effects of 
corruption is larger for horizontal investments than vertical investments. Overall, 
considering all previous evidence, a host country’s level of corruption is an 
important determinant of inward FDI, and corruption is likely to lessen the 
attractiveness of a specific location to international investors (Webster and 
Piesse, 2018).  
However, another stream of research has reached different conclusions. For 
example, Egger and Winner (2005) reported a positive and statistically significant 
link between FDI and corruption and concluded that corruption is a stimulus for 
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FDI. Likewise, by using a sample of non-financial U.S. Multinational Corporations 
MNCs over the 1995–1998 and the 2002–2005 periods, Pantzalis et al. (2008) 
revealed that corruption is more likely to escalate the gains from foreign 
investment in locations where the quality of governance is poor, and corruption 
is present. In this context, corruption can be considered to smooth transactions 
and accelerate procedures that would otherwise not take place, or occur with more 
struggle (Huntington, 1968; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Accordingly, foreign 
investors may survive in corrupt countries by taking advantage of the corrupt 
systems in some highly corrupt countries, while some foreign investors suffer 
from the cost of corruption.  
In this sense, the institutional quality of the home country of FDI may influence 
the firm’s location choices and becomes a relevant and vital driving factor in 
deciding to invest in corrupt country or not. For example, the US has adopted law 
that forbids US investors to bribe local public officials; hence, bribery or 
corruption abroad is punishable by law. Another example is that the OECD Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, which was effective since 1999, prohibits bribes to foreign public 
officials by firms from member countries (Wu, 2006). The level of corruption in 
host and source countries may vary and this may also create different circum-
stances for international investors. For example, Wu (2006) found that corruption 
distance, which is the difference of the level of corruption in the host and source 
countries, deters cross-border investments. A home country’s laws may prevent 
its firms from investing in a corrupt host country, and this tendency may encourage 
them to invest in a less corrupt country. By using Russian firm-level panel data 
for the period 1996–2007, Ledyaeva et al. (2013) revealed that foreign investors 
from less corrupt and democratic countries are more likely to invest in less corrupt 
and more democratic Russian regions, while foreign investors from more corrupt 
and non-democratic countries prone to invest in more corrupt and less democratic 
regions.  
In this thesis, the link between corruption and firm performance has already 
been discussed and possible double-sided effects were mentioned. Accordingly, 
it is essential to consider that positive and negative consequences of corruption 
on firm performance could be highly dependent on the ownership type of the firm – 
whether the firm is foreign or domestically owned. Corruption could have an 
asymmetric impact on foreign and domestic owned firms. For instance, foreign 
owned firms may have better access to finance; thus, possible costs of corruption 
can be surpassed. On the contrary, domestic firms may not have any other outside 
option and may have difficulties in accessing finance, hence, corruption may 
deteriorate their operations more than foreign owned firms. In addition, foreign 
and domestically owned firms’ performance may be asymmetrically influenced 
by the host country’s environment. One may assume that local firms are more 
familiar with the local corrupt environment than foreign owned firms; therefore, 
local firms can take advantage of the system. This can damage competitiveness 
in the market, and eventually crowd out foreign owned firms from the market. 
Using firm level data for 41 emerging countries, Webster and Piesse (2018) 
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showed that foreign-owned firms could adapt to local practices and are indifferent 
regarding likelihood of paying bribes in contrast to domestic owned firms. 
 
 
Dimensions of Corruption  
The types of corruption, and differences between types, have been already 
presented in earlier sections. Apart from bribery, the different dimensions of 
corruption include, among others, political corruption (grand corruption) and 
bureaucratic corruption (petty corruption), which can be relevant to the firm 
performance. Firms tend to seek alternative non-market strategies to enhance firm 
performance. One of the common strategies is to have political connections, 
which may influence to the firm performance through different mechanisms. By 
using a survey of Chinese private firms, Li et al., (2008) have found that the Party 
membership of private entrepreneurs has a positive impact on the firm perfor-
mance. One explanation is that Party membership aids these firms to get loans 
from banks or other state institutions and affords them more confidence in the 
legal system. This effect is stronger in regions with weaker market institutions 
and weaker legal protection (Li et al., 2008). Firms may prefer to approach 
politicians since they are likely to be better informed about the future economic 
programs, and so their opinion could positively influence firm performance 
(Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010). Moreover, firms with political connections are more 
likely to enjoy tax benefits compared to those without these connections (Wu et 
al., 2012). Hence, tax benefits could help to improve firm performance. Lastly, 
political connections may also help to reduce the incidence of enforcement action 
against corporate fraud in weaker legal environments (Wu et al., 2016).  
Political corruption requires a high level of interaction between firms and 
political actors. There are cases where firms, especially small and medium 
enterprises, have to deal with smaller actors such as public servants or bureaucrats. 
In many developing countries, with underdeveloped institutions, one common 
issue in bureaucracy is the presence of rigid and ambiguous regulations. This 
creates red tape, and the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the firms in exchange 
for reducing the amount of red tape (Guriev, 2004). However, “when rules can 
be used to extract bribes, more rules will be created.” (Tanzi, 1998, p 582). For 
extracting more informal payments, new “rules” would be introduced. For 
example, if a firm is planning to introduce new product which requires a new 
license for entering a market. However, receiving the license could be obstructed 
by a possible bribe request from public servant, and the firm may prefer to 
circumvent this red tape, or rigid bureaucratic procedures, by providing informal 
payments. Hence, this kind of behavior, or solution, may facilitate firm operations, 



















3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 Summary of the studies  
Corruption takes place with participation of two spheres, which are private and 
public. Previous works tend to focus on corruption which is initiated, and driven, 
by the public sphere and imposed upon the private sphere. Such approaches, how-
ever, have failed to address several vital issues in this relationship: 1. corruption 
may occur within the private sphere; 2. the role of managerial moral considera-
tions in participating in private to private corruption; 3. the relevance of mana-
gerial characteristics in involving corruption in private and public spheres; 4. the 
role of ownership types in the correlation of corruption (between private and 
public spheres) and firm performance; 5. the types of corruption, and their link to 
firm performance. Accordingly, this thesis addressed these issues and filled this 
gap in corruption studies. This thesis explored these issues by focusing on two 
stages: 1. antecedents of the decision-making process of managers on whether to 
get involved in corruption, both private-to-private corruption and private-to-
public corruption; 2. the consequences of corruption on firm performance with 
consideration of different settings. In this way, this thesis could provide a 
complete picture of the corruption in the private sphere, which starts from the 
decision-making process prior to corruption and ends with consequences on firm 
performance. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to provide an in-depth under-
standing of the private side of corruption from firm managers’ decision-making 
processes, to the consequences on firm performance. Lastly, in this thesis, 
representatives of the private sphere will be private firms and their managers.  
This thesis encompasses four different articles, and each of them sheds light 
on different perspectives in investigating corruption. Therefore, these different 
perspectives could add value to the investigation of the private sphere in cor-
ruption relations. More specifically, in this thesis, I underline various dimensions 
of the relationship between corruption, manager’s decision-making processes, 
and firm performance. In particular, (a) manager’s cost benefit analysis versus 
moral judgements in private-to-private corruption (Study I); (b) the role of 
managerial traits in private-to-public sector corruption (Study II); (c) the impact 
of bribery on firm performance in foreign versus domestic owned firms (Study III); 
(d) different types of corruption and firm performance (Study IV).  
The results of the essays demonstrate that interconnections among corruption-
manager-firm performance are complex and sensitive to the specific factors and 
drivers present for different parts of these relationships. The research tasks have 
been developed based on the prior empirical and theoretical premises and 
addressed based on the empirical analysis. Empirical identification of the original 
determinants of managers’ propensity to engage bribe enables us to quantify 
previously unobserved factors, which influence managers’ decision making. 
Furthermore, empirical investigation of the association between corruption (and 
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its dimensions) and firm performance allows us to examine previously over-
looked aspects of two sides of the relationship. Table 4 demonstrates research 
tasks of the studies and their results. The results include the outcomes of the 
estimations. 
 
The role of costs, benefits, and moral judgments  
in private-to-private corruption (Study I) 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon, and research on corruption has been mostly 
restricted to the interaction of private and public sectors. Furthermore, rational 
choice theory was a commonly utilized theory in order to explain individuals’ 
tendency to engage in corruption. Much of the literature on corruption studies tends 
to focus on developing countries that have a lower ranking in the Corruption Per-
ception Index (lower ranking means that country is highly corrupted) since they 
provide a vast domain for corruption studies. However, developed countries have 
also put forward different opportunities for investigating corruption, for example, 
private-to-private corruption. Since Study I focuses on two developed countries, 
Estonia and Denmark, it is expected to alleviate concerns over country coverage 
of other studies. To fill this gap, Study I aimed to investigate the role of costs, 
benefits, and moral judgments in private-to-private corruption in Denmark and 
Estonia. (Related tasks, i.e. Task 1,2,3 can be seen in Table 4). This work 
contributes to existing knowledge of corruption by investigating private-to-
private corruption, and by providing a deeper insight into the explanatory powers 
of existing theories in private to private corruption.  
By using a sample of Danish and Estonian managers, findings from Study I 
underline that instrumental rationality, or rational choice theory, has failed to 
explain private-to-private corruption, but cognitive rationality has a significant 
explanatory power. More precisely, bribing-related personal moral judgment was 
closely associated to the perception of bribing in the industry, while bribing-
related costs and benefits were obsolete. Rational choice theory asserts that costs 
and benefits are the primary determinants of an individual’s intention and 
behaviour in engaging in corruption. Accordingly, utility maximisation may not 
be a predominant predictor of engaging corrupt acts. Personal moral judgments 
on bribing are more important in deciding to get involved in private-to-private 
corruption.  
There are two likely causes for the irrelevance of cost considerations of man-
agers in their intentions and behaviours towards corruption. First, it is complicated 
to uncover evidence regarding private-to-private corruption (Mansikkamäki and 
Muttilainen (2016). This makes it difficult to initiate internal or external 
investigation. Accordingly, managers would be less worried about their corrupt 
interaction and possible costs. Second, not many prosecutors apply charges 
against people for white collar crime (Mishra, 2006), and organizations are less 
likely to face deterring charges (Holmes, 2009; Hulpke, 2017). Accordingly, cost 
considerations may not be the main concerns while involving illegal practices in 
a working environment.  
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The role of managerial traits in firm-level corruption:  
evidence from Vietnam (Study II) 
This study addresses determinants of a manager’s decision-making process in the 
private-public corruption. In the context of Study II, corruption primarily refers 
to bribery. The public sphere of bribes, to date, has dominated the literature, and 
the private sphere of corruption has received less attention. This could be mainly 
because the private sphere of corruption has been considered as a victim of these 
illegal actions. The use of a Vietnamese dataset will allow us to provide more 
insights how the private sphere is shaped in country where corruption is wide-
spread and part of the business climate. Therefore, Study II focuses on the private 
sphere of corruption interactions with public offices by investigating the role of 
managerial personality traits as an important determinant of corrupt interactions 
(related tasks, i.e. Task 4,5,6,7 can be seen in Table 4). The empirical findings in 
this study provide a new understanding of the determinants of a manager’s 
decision-making process by analysing the relationship between managerial traits 
and corruption tendencies. Furthermore, by introducing the interaction terms 
between bribery and managerial personality traits, Study II aims to investigate 
whether firm performance gets affected when managers with specific personality 
traits are engaged in acts of corruption. 
Study II revealed that managers with the trait of innovativeness have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of getting engaged in paying a bribe. A possible explana-
tion for this might be that managers are expected to be innovative for improving 
firm productivity and, hence, profits as corruption is a hidden activity, and requires 
new ways to establish interconnections with bribe receivers and transfer informal 
payments. The innovativeness trait of a manager may assist them in discovering 
new and alternative ways to perform these illegal actions. Managers who have 
risk loving personality traits have a higher likelihood to get involved in bribery 
than risk averse managers. This result may be explained by the fact that managers 
could prefer to make risky decisions, and for higher productivity, they could 
invest in risky practices. In addition, corruption is an illegal and risky activity, 
hence, managers with risk loving traits could have a higher likelihood of prac-
ticing bribery for enhancing the firm’s productivity. However, managers with 
high internal control, or locus of control, have a lower probability of paying 
informal payments for enhancing firm performances. Lastly, managers, who have 
risk loving characteristics and get engaged in bribe payments are related to lower 
firm performance. Although risk loving traits lead to the higher likelihood of 
paying a bribe, excessive risk-taking behaviour may not be helpful for firm per-
formance, instead it may have adverse effects on firm performance.  
Overall, Study I and Study II provide new insights on the corruption between 
private and public spheres, and within the private sphere by indicating the role of 
managerial considerations and traits in decision-making processes. The findings 
from these studies make several contributions to the current literature. While 
Study I showed a different consideration mechanism behind involvements in 
private-to-private corruption, the latter has demonstrated the role of managerial 
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traits in private-to-public corruption and the possible consequences of the 
interactions on firm performance. The combination of these two articles put 
forward an original and novel way to study the decision-making process of 
managers under two distinctive settings which are private-to-private corruption 
in the developed countries Denmark and Estonia, and private-to-public corruption 
in the transition country Vietnam. Furthermore, Study III and Study IV have 
focused on the link between corruption and firm performance by considering 
specific features of transition countries.  
 
Does corruption affect local and foreign-owned companies differently? 
Evidence from the BEEPS survey (Study III). 
One of the most significant discussions in corruption related studies is whether a 
corrupt environment is associated with foreign investments. Also, if it is, then 
whether this link has a positive or negative outcome on foreign investments. Up 
to now, far too little attention has been paid to how corruption relates to the per-
formance of foreign and domestically owned firms. Accordingly, Study III aims 
to fill this void by providing important contributions on two different under-
studied issues in corruption literature. More specifically, the aims of Study III are 
twofold. First, it investigates whether there is a link between inward FDI and 
bribery in the host countries. Second, it examines the link between bribery and 
the productivity of foreign and domestically owned firms separately. Previous 
studies have shown that the influence of home country institutions is an important 
driving force on firms’ investments in host countries (see e.g. Estrin et al., 2016). 
Corruption distance between the home country and the host country could be 
important determinant of FDI in highly corrupt host countries (Godinez & Liu, 
2015). Firms from less corrupt countries may not choose to invest in highly 
corrupt countries (Karhunen and Ledyaeva, 2012). Accordingly, this study 
further considers the role of the corruption level of country in the link between 
bribery and the productivity of foreign and domestically owned firms (related 
tasks, i.e. Task 8,9,10,11 can be seen in Table 4). This paper makes use of cross-
sectional firm-level data from the fifth round of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V), which mainly covers post-communist 
countries. This survey is adequate for empirical analysis, since it has detailed 
information about firms, including their infrastructure, services, sales, supplies, 
competition, innovation, and especially, perceptions regarding business-govern-
ment relations.  
This study employs logistic regression and IV 2SLS estimation techniques to 
estimate the aforementioned relationships. Findings of this study show that 
bribery is negatively linked to firm productivity. The magnitude of this negative 
link becomes larger for the productivity of foreign owned firms than domestic 
firms in highly corrupt countries. It implies that foreign owned firms suffer from 
the cost of bribes more severely than domestically owned firms. A possible 
explanation for this might be that the familiarity of domestic firms to the local 
corrupt environment and public officials could alleviate the negative effect of the 
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cost of the bribes on their productivity. Additionally, one may say that wide-
spread corruption in a country could, in fact, affect the competition in the market 
by crowding out foreign investors from the market. Otherwise, foreign investors 
could adapt local norms and behave according to the “rules of the game” in order 
for surviving in a highly corrupted country. 
 
Dimension of corruption and firm performance:  
an empirical analysis from BEEPS survey (Study IV) 
Similarly, to Study III, Study IV investigates the link between corruption and 
firm performance. Study III has elaborated the potential driving factors of firm 
characteristics and features of countries which relate to investments because these 
may affect the firm productivity. In contrast, Study IV focuses on the corruption 
side of the link between corruption and firm productivity by differentiating cor-
ruption types and analysing their possible effects on firm productivity. In this 
way, these two articles may provide a quite clear picture of the relationship 
between corruption and firm performance by investigating thoroughly both sides 
of the relationship. (Related tasks, i.e. Task 12,13,14 can be seen in Table 4). 
Previous studies have attempted to study the different types of the corruption 
such as political corruption, bribery, and bureaucratic corruption in different 
contexts, but no study has examined these three dimensions together as this study 
has done in context of post-communist countries. This study makes use of BEEPS 
survey in order to investigate the effect of different dimensions of corruption on 
firm performance. This survey provides very detailed information regarding 
business-government relations by asking specifically designed questions for 
example, perceptions about politics and political connections in transition 
countries. In summation, the purpose of this study was to investigate the inter-
connections among different dimensions of corruption, and to analyse the 
association between different dimensions of corruption on firm performance.  
Findings from this study suggests that red tape has a strong relationship with 
the frequency of bribe payments and political corruption. Likewise, political 
corruption has a somewhat strong relationship with the frequency of bribe pay-
ments. Therefore, one may say that even though each dimension of corruption 
seems to be different, there is a common relationship among them. On the other 
hand, the results suggest that firm being engaged in political corruption is 
positively…”.– related to firm productivity. This result may be explained by the 
fact that firms may exploit their political connections for improving their firm 
operations and productivity. Moreover, red tape, or bureaucratic corruption, is 
positively linked to firm productivity. As previously discussed, public officials 
could intentionally impose various blocks and clauses to frustrate firms to pay 
bribes before firms are granted access to a particular licence for some key projects 
or a license for specific products. Therefore, firms in corrupt countries may prefer 
to overcome rigid bureaucratic procedures by paying bribes or fulfilling the needs 
of public officials. Hence, this solution can accelerate firm operations and it can 
be seen that bureaucratic corruption has a positive impact on firm productivity. 
146 
However, this second-best solution could be cost efficient in the short term but 
not useful in long term. Another result was that the perceived extent of bribe, and 
the bribe experience are positively associated to firm productivity. While the 
former focuses on perceptions, the latter focuses on proxies for experiences. A 
possible explanation could be that when managers perceive that corruption in the 
country where they operate is widespread problem, then they begin to find ways 
to bribe the people in charge. It could be said that managers pay informal pay-
ments once they ensure that this payment will definitely speed up transactions. 
This thesis now turns to discussions of possible policy implications and puts 
forward anti-corruption strategies for preventing corruption. 
All in all, the findings of the empirical studies in this thesis have presented 
different aspects of private-to-private and private-to-public corruption. Study I 
shed light on managers’ considerations in private to private corruption, whereas 
Study II contributes to our understanding of managerial antecedents of private-
to-public corruption. The combination of these two studies constitutes half of the 
research plan of this thesis by focusing on factors of managers’ involvement in 
corruption. In the other half, Study III and IV, primarily emphasized the possible 
consequences of corruption on firm performance. Study III contributes to existing 
knowledge of corruption by presenting the importance of ownership type and 
country level corruption in corruption-firm relations. Study IV, however, 
emphasized the relevance of different types of corruption in the link between 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2 Practical Implications 
The findings of this thesis present several practical implications to firm managers 
and policy makers who wish to tackle corruption. However, one should bear in 
mind that combatting corruption is a complex issue which entails an inter-
disciplinary approach and a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be the right 
solution for this problem (Teichmann, 2018). Although detailed practical impli-
cations have been provided in studies, some are presented here in concise way.  
 
1. This thesis has emphasized the role of cost-benefit analysis and moral judge-
ments in managers’ considerations to engage corruption and suggests that moral 
judgment could play important role to reduce their tendency to be involved in 
corruption. Therefore, anti-corruption measures in firms may be designed to 
target moral aspects and the possible costs of corruption including reputational 
losses of firm via specific trainings because employees could be uninformed 
regarding corruption and unaware of the legal consequences of corruption 
(Becker et al., 2013). Hauser (2019) presented evidence that business profes-
sionals who have undertaken anti-corruption training have a higher prob-
ability to reject prevailing justifications of corrupt practices than those who 
have not been trained. These trainings could even start before professional life 
during higher education. Higher education institutions should integrate courses 
related to combatting corruption into university curricula (Becker et al., 2013). 
Consequently, this strategy may help to prevent corruption and could obstruct 
corrupt behaviour when these future decision makers become actual decision 
makers and business professionals. 
2. This thesis has outlined that innovative and risk loving managers are more 
likely to engage in corruption. Essentially, these are managerial traits that are 
important for firm success. Managers are economically driven, and they would 
want to achieve the best for the firm. It would not be wise to design anti-
corruption measures to target innovative and risk loving managers simply 
because they have higher probability of paying bribe. Here, a wise suggestion 
would be that governments should take action to develop institutions for 
satisfying the needs of the business actors. Easing business practices are vital 
since managers would prefer to pay informal payment for removing bureau-
cratic obstacles and accelerating transactions in developing countries. Accord-
ingly, without well developed and effective institutions, corruption will persist 
as a way of doing business. Once these institutions are established, managers 
will not waste their resources in corruption.  
3. This thesis has shown that foreign owned firms are likely to suffer from cor-
ruption compared to the domestic owned firms, especially in highly corrupt 
countries. Multinational companies often face corruption or related issues in 
countries where the institutional setting is poor, and they may have to pay bribe 
to overcome bureaucratic regulations. To prevent these issues, the international 
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community has introduced new conventions4. Despite these efforts, positive 
changes in corruption levels are rarely seen. At this point, governments of 
corrupt countries should initiate anti-corruption measures through strength-
ening law enforcement against corruption and maintaining property rights 
protections in order to receive inward FDI and create a clean business 
environment for domestic firms.  
4. In general, bribery is found to deteriorate firm performance. Also, more 
regulations and procedures are likely to be results with higher corruption, thus, 
simpler bureaucracy and more transparency would lead to lessen corruption 
(Sharma and Mitra, 2015). To reduce the ambiguous procedural demands of 
public officials, such as extra documents, from individuals and firms, the in-
stallation of e-systems e.g. e-governance would help to increase transparency, 
accountability, and traceability of interactions and transactions (Ionescu, 
2016). However, transparency may not be enough to stop corruption (Kolstad 
and Wiig, 2009). Curbing corruption can be complemented by other varieties 
of policies and changes. For example, Kim et al. (2009) argue that effective 
use of ICT to curb corruption needs effective political leadership to design 
and apply related policies to ascertain whether investments are efficiently 
allocated. 
5. This thesis identified that bureaucratic and political corruption are positively 
related to firm performance. This does not imply that these types of corruption 
are good for firms and market structure. Because bureaucratic and political 
corruption are classified as grand corruption, and firms would get engaged in 
grand corruption for gaining a competitive advantage, obtaining public con-
tracts, avoiding taxes, and reducing transaction costs. Accordingly, these could 
damage competition, and these may not serve a positive purpose in long term. 
Hence, police makers should design anti-corruption policies that would 
discourage firms and political figures to cooperate for corruption.  
 
 
3.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The studies that constitute this thesis have their own shortcomings. Under this 
subchapter, I will discuss the limitations related to these studies. Even though 
these drawbacks would not be expected to influence the reliability and firmness 
of the findings, they have to be addressed while interpreting these results. 
Accordingly, several suggestions will be provided for future research. 
                                                                          
4  For instance, United States of America has initiated The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) to fight global business corruption. Similarly, the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was introduced in 
1999, and outlaws bribe payments to foreign officials by firms from member countries (Wu, 
2006). Likewise, in 2002, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was 
introduced and, in 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption was initiated to 
prevent corruption (Argandoña, 2007; Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014). 
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All the corruption related studies, and studies that have been used in this 
thesis, suffer from self-reported surveys. Despite its own reasonable advantages, 
the drawbacks of self-reporting as a method are particularly relevant when 
studying unethical behaviour. This shortcoming also exists in Study I. Another 
limitation of the Study I is that the method of data collection was through tele-
phone interviews, and respondents’ accurate understanding of the question or the 
issue at hand may not be verified. The last shortcoming of the Study I is that 
dataset comes from only two countries, so the generalization can at best be made 
for small European countries, but not for the business world at large. Likewise, 
these two countries are considered to be developed countries and are highly 
ranked in internationally recognized corruption rankings.  
Consequently, suggestions for future research continue as follows. In spite of 
the challenges in data collection, one should gather data through other means of 
data collection instead of telephone interviews, for example, by face to face 
interviews. This may increase the reliability of data used in empirical analysis. 
One can repeat a similar study with a larger sample of the business professionals 
from different sectors and in different countries. Especially, to widen our know-
ledge and not to limit our corruption perspectives with private-to-public cor-
ruption, this field needs more attention on private-to-private corruption. A special 
focus could be on the behaviour of managers and business professionals in 
private-to-private corruption in highly corrupted countries. This will enable us to 
learn more about the driving mechanism behind their decisions in acts of 
corruption in highly corrupted business environment.  
Study II has also several drawbacks. First, it employs cross-sectional data, 
thus one should be cautions in interpreting the observed patterns as causal impacts. 
Nevertheless, the observed relationship may be consistent with causal linkage. 
For example, one can argue that corrupt behaviour is very stable in time, so size-
able changes may not occur in short term in a country where corruption is a 
widespread phenomenon. The second shortcoming of this study lies in the fact 
that the study relied on a single country based empirical analysis, which was 
Vietnam. Since Vietnam has an exclusive business climate with a different cultural 
environment and complex interpersonal connections, managerial traits may be 
differently shaped in Vietnam. Specific managerial traits with an influence on 
corruption and firm performance may vary in countries where bribery is less 
common and not accepted by society. Accordingly, future studies may repeat by 
considering the abovementioned shortcomings, which regard the locale of data. 
Even though it is not easy to find rich and reliable datasets, future scholars may 
employ longitudinal datasets in multi-country contexts. This study put Vietnam 
as the centre of study. Future research may examine the relationship between 
managerial traits and corruption in the context of developed and other developing 
countries.  
Study III and IV employ the same dataset, which is the cross-sectional BEEPS 
survey. Therefore, the common limitation of both of the studies lies in the fact 
that any study of corruption at the firm level is imperfect. Since corruption has 
secretive nature and is an illegitimate activity, it is complicated to obtain an 
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accurate measure of corruption. Future studies could consider abovementioned 
caveats of this study and repeat similar analysis by using a panel data set and less 
perception-based surveys. Another limitation was that the influence of corruption 
on economic performance could be dissimilar in the short and long term. While 
firms may take advantage of corruption in the short run, the firms’ operations 
could be hurt by corruption in the long run. Since this study is limited to the cross-
sectional analysis due the nature of the BEEPS data, it was not possible to 
measure short and long run consequences of corruption on firm performance. 
Further research might explore the short and long run effects of corruption on 
firm productivity by utilizing a panel dataset if that becomes available.  
Finally, yet importantly, there could be concerns regarding use of different 
datasets from different countries in this thesis. For example, Study II is a single 
country, Vietnam, analysis. Single country analysis would enable researchers to 
undertake in depth analysis of corruption and single country analysis could be 
used as a road map for future comparative analysis. In addition, Estonia (Study I), 
Vietnam (Study II) and most of countries in BEEPS survey (Study III and IV) 
have experienced a communist regime. This common characteristic would be 
expected to enhance comparability and the ability to fit the results all into one 
system. However, the findings of these studies could be different in other countries 
with different historical, cultural, and institutional background. Therefore, future 
studies would widen our perspective by performing similar empirical analysis in 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN – KOKKUVÕTE 
Uurimused firma tasandil toimuvast korruptsioonist 
Uurimuste motivatsioon ja põhiidee 
Korruptsiooni on peetud üheks suuremaks majandust pärssivaks probleemiks, 
mis levib kiiresti ja takistab majanduse arengut. Maailma Majandusfoorum aval-
das viimastele hinnangutele tuginedes, et korruptsioon läheb aastas maksma üle 
2,6 triljoni USA dollari, Maailmapanga andmetel makstakse aastas vähemalt üks 
triljon USA dollarit altkäemaksudena. Üle kahe aastakümne on erinevad uuri-
mused viinud läbi korruptsiooniga seotud majanduslikku analüüsi (nt Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Jain, 2001; Aidt, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2006; ja Treis-
man, 2007). Lisaks on teadlased mitu kümnendit avaldanud ülevaateid või uuri-
musi analüüsimaks empiirilise sisuga artiklite panust korruptsiooniuuringutes (nt 
Ades and Tella, 1996; Azfar et al., 2001; Dimant ja Tosato, 2018). Nimelt on just 
empiirilised uuringud tõestanud, et korruptsioonil on riigi tasandil negatiivsed 
mõjud. Näiteks vähendab korruptsioon bürokraatia tõhusust (Ahlin ja Bose, 2007), 
pärsib majanduskasvu (Glaeser ja Saks, 2006; Cieślik, ja Goczek, 2018), kahan-
dab välismaiseid otseinvesteeringuid (Barassi and Zhou, 2012; Mathur ja Singh, 
2013), suurendab vaesust (Gupta et al., 2002), viib suurema varimajanduseni 
(Dreher et al., 2009). Selles väitekirjas ei jätkata riigi tasandi korruptsiooni eri-
nevate põhjuste ja tagajärgede aruteluga. Siiski innustavad eelnimetatud korrupt-
siooni negatiivsed tagajärjed uurijaid selle nähtusega erinevatest vaatepunktidest 
tegelema. 
Korruptsioon riigis ei ole vaid majanduslik nähe, seda võib iseloomustada ka 
kui tulemust – kui riigi seaduslike, majanduslike, kultuuriliste ja poliitiliste insti-
tutsioonide peegelpilti (Svensson, 2005). Seega on korruptsiooni võimalik käsit-
leda kui institutsioonide toimimisriket ja selle erinevaid külgi tuleks enne eba-
soodsate tagajärgede leevendamist ja lahenduste pakkumist põhjalikumalt uurida. 
Korruptsioon väljendub erinevates vormides ja neid erivorme käsitletaksegi 
selles doktoritöös.  
Merriam Websteri veebisõnastiku järgi on korruptsioon „võimulolijate (näiteks 
valitsusliikme või politseiniku) ebaaus või illegaalne käitumine“5. Kuna sõna-
raamatu seletus näib kitsana, on korruptsioonile antud teisigi seletusi ning igaüks 
neist keskendub mingile korruptsiooni küljele. Kui ühed tõstavad esile korrupt-
siooni ebaseaduslikku poolt: „ebaseaduslik makse avaliku elu tegelasele kasu-
saamise eesmärgil eraisikule või firmale“ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, lk 517), või: 
„teod, mille käigus avalik-õiguslikku võimu kasutatakse eraisiku huvides nii, et 
see läheb mängureeglitega vastuollu“ (Jain, 2001, lk 73); „valitsuse vara müümine 
valitsusametniku poolt eratulu saamise eesmärgil“ (Shleifer ja Vishny, 1993, 
lk 599) või „avalik-õigusliku positsiooni väärkasutamine erahuvides“ (Svensson, 
2005, lk 20), siis teised tõstavad esile majanduslikke seoseid: „rahalised maksed 
                                                                          
5  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption 
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isikutele (nii avalikele kui ka eraisikutele) eesmärgiga neid nende ülemuste soove 
eirama meelitada, selle asemel panna neid soosima pistise maksjate huvisid“ (Rose-
Ackerman, 2006, lk xiv). Rahvusvaheline korruptsioonivastane valitsusväline 
organisatsioon Transparency International on korruptsiooni laiema definit-
sioonina välja pakkunud järgneva: „usaldatud võimu kuritarvitamine omakasu 
eesmärgil“. See seletus hõlmab mitmeid erinevaid korruptsiooni külgi ning 
omadusi ja see on selle väitekirja põhiline korruptsiooni definitsioon. 
 
 
Joonis 1: Suur pilt: osapooltevaheline korruptsioon.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon Pedersen ja Johannsen (2008) andmetel. 
 
Korruptsiooni kontseptualiseerimiseks on oluline määratleda selle liikmed või 
osapooled. Peamiselt on korruptsioonil kaks poolt: era- ja avalik sektor. Joonis 1 
illustreerib noolte abil viit võimalikku suhtetüüpi osapoolte sees ja vahel. Üldiselt 
tuntud korruptsioon esineb erasektori ja avaliku sektori vahel, erasektorist avaliku 
suunal ja avalikust sektorist erasektori suunal, vastavalt nool nr 1 ja 2. Nool nr 1 
viitab salajasele koostööle; nt kui firma teeb strateegilise valiku ja pakub altkäe-
maksu, et suurendada ennustatavat majanduskasu (Martin et al., 2007; Eddleston 
et al., 2019). Teiste sõnadega võiks seda nimetada mõjutamist otsivaks suhteks. 
Ettevõtted muutuvad kuritegelikuks proovides seadusevastastes praktikates osa-
ledes firma heaolu suurendada (Ufere et al., 2012). Motivatsioon korruptsiooni 
jaoks võib tulla sellest, et firmad saavad sellest tavalist kasu, näiteks tehinguliste 
toimingutega seotud kasu, sujuvamaid juhtimisega seotud teenuseid või ligipääsu 
ärilistele lisavõimalustele, näiteks riiklikele lepingutele (Nguyen et al., 2016). 
Niisiis on ettevõtjate illegaalsed maksed vabatahtlikud, lisaks paistab, et need 
maksed teenivad mõlema osapoole ühist kasu. 
Nool nr 2 viitab väljapressimisele (Eddleston et al., 2019), kui avaliku sektori 
ametnikke arvatakse olevat kuritegelikud või läbi suruma midagi, mis on korrup-
tiivsusele kalduv, kasutades mitteformaalseid vahendeid äriliste tehingute läbi-
viimisel (Ashforth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008). Avaliku sektori ametnik saab 
hõlpsalt nõuda pistist, sest avaliku sektori ametnikul on monopoolne seisund ja 
võim ise selle üle otsustada (Shleifer ja Vishny, 1993), mida pistise andjal on vaja 
(Cuervo-Cazurro, 2016). Üksikisikud peavad altkäemaksu maksma, sest pistise 
andjad ei tee vabatahtlikult illegaalset makset, nende eesmärk on saada valitsuse 
poolt pakutavaid teenuseid, mida peaks saama ilma mitteametlike lisamakseteta 
(Karhunen et al., 2018). Tulemuseks on, et avaliku sektori ametnikke peetakse 
aktiivseteks kurjategijateks, samal ajal, kui pistise andjaid koheldakse kui 
korruptsiooni ohvreid. 
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Nool nr 3 viitab korruptsioonile, mis toimub ühe erasektori sees või erinevate 
erasektorite vahel (erasektorit-erasektorile suhe). Vastupidiselt harjumuspärasele 
arvamusele ei piirdu korruptsioon omavahelise mõjutamisega erasektori liikmete 
(üksikisiku või firma) vahel, kes maksavad või lubavad pistist maksta avaliku 
sektori osapoolele (nt poliitikule või valitsuse ametnikule) eelise saavutamise või 
sellest mitte ilma jäämise eesmärgil (Argandoña, 2003). Erasektorilt-erasektorile 
korruptsioon on veel üht liiki korruptsioon, mida paljud pole sageli arvesse võtnud, 
ning akadeemiline kogukond pidanud vajalikuks süvitsi uurida. Erasektorilt-
erasektorile korruptsiooni võib defineerida kui ühe eraasutuse esindaja(te) eeldust 
saada konkreetset kasu, pakkudes teise eraasutuse esindaja(te)le selle eest rahalist 
või mitterahalist tasu (Jaakson et al., 2019). Sellist tüüpi suhe ei kaasa avalikku 
sektorit ja see toimib tänu riigi korrumpeerunud ärikultuurile. 
Nool nr 4 viitab korruptsioonile, mis toimub avaliku sektori sees või erinevate 
avalike sektorite vahel. Sarnaselt erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsioonile on seda 
sorti korruptsioon paljude teadlaste poolt tähelepanuta jäänud, kuna korrupt-
sioonile on lähenetud kui äri ja valitsuse vahelistele suhetele. Kuna riigifirmadel 
(RF) võivad olla teised eesmärgid kui kasumit taotlevate firmade ärilised ees-
märgid (Shaheer et al., 2019), võib korruptiivne koostöö toimuda teistes vormides, 
näiteks teenete ja mitte-rahaliste vastastikkuste tegudena. Riigifirmad seavad 
eesmärke organisatsiooni tasemel ja RF-i juhid toetuvad poliitilistele kontaktidele, 
nad ei pea erikohtlemise nimel maksma altkäemaksu. Oluline on ka välja tuua, et 
töötajad, sh juhid, eelistavad maksta pistist, et saada paremini makstud ja mõju-
kamat kohta RF sees.  
Veel üht tüüpi suhet näitab nool nr 5, mil nimeks „väljumisstrateegia“ ja millel 
on seos endistes kommunistlikes maades toimunud erastamisprotsessiga (Pedersen 
ja Johannsen, 2008). Kui Nõukogude Liit lagunes, leidis aset laiahaardeline 
erastamine, omand liikus alajuhitud ja ebaefektiivselt avalikult sektorist vähe-
arenenud erasektorisse. Paralleelselt tekkis nõukogude aja korrumpeerunud 
avaliku sektori ametnikel võimalus kohaneda erasektoriga. See omakorda viis 
tihenda koostöövõrgu tekkeni avaliku ja erasektori vahel. See säilitas võimalusi 
korruptsiooni eluspüsimiseks isegi uues turumajanduslikus olukorras. 
Korruptsioonis osalejad võivad kasutada nii rahalisi kui mitte-rahalisi 
maksevahendeid. Rahalised tulud võivad olla lihtsalt makse vormis, nagu näiteks 
mitteametlik makse või teistlaadi rahalised tulud (nt lapsele kõrgkooli jaoks 
stipendium), mitte-rahalised tulud võivad olla erinevad teened või sobilik avalik 
kuvand (Wu ja Huang, 2013; Sanyal, 2005). Pistist saab defineerida kui „millegi 
pakkumine, lubamine või andmine, selleks, et mõjutada avaliku sektori amet-
nikku loobuma oma ametlikest kohustustest“ (OECD Observer, 2000, lk 3). Veelgi 
enam – korruptsiooni-uuringud asetavad pistise kesksele kohale öeldes, et see 
sümboliseerib kogu korruptsiooni olemust. Niisugust olukorda võib seletada 
altkäemaksu laia levimisega ja sellega, et altkäemaks on kergelt äratuntav 
korruptsiooni vorm. (Soot, 2013). Tuleb öelda, et pistise andmist või veelgi 
mitteametlikumat, kinkide vahetamist on peetud korruptsiooni indikaatoriks 
(alamkategooriaks) ja seda ka käesolevas töös kasutatud uurimustes. 
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Tabel 1: Korruptsiooni tüpoloogia võttes aluseks korruptsioonis osalejate era- ja avalike 
sfääridega seotuse ja maksevahendite iseloomu 
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Ministrid 










ministrid. MR & R 
Allikas: Autori koostatud, Pedersen ja Johannsen (2008) andmetel. 
 
Tabel nr 1 näitab korruptsiooni tüpoloogiat, võttes aluseks korruptsioonis osalejate 
era- ja avalike sfääridega seotuse ja maksevahendite iseloomu. Korruptsiooni 
suurus aitab meil eristada pisi- ja kõrgetasemelist korruptsiooni. Igal tüübil on 
oma alltüübid. Madala astme korruptsioon viitab igapäevastele korruptsiooni 
praktikatele, mis leiavad aset inimeste ja avaliku sektori ametnike vahel, näiteks 
liikluspolitsei ja autojuhid. Sellist tüüpi praktikas on põhiliseks tuluks raha, 
näiteks altkäemaks ning sellise pisi-korruptsiooni sünonüümiks kasutatakse 
sageli väljendeid nagu „madalama astme korruptsioon“, „tea money“ (Tilman, 
1968, lk 439). Teisalt toimub bürokraatlik korruptsioon (mõnikord nimetatud ka 
administratiivseks korruptsiooniks) madalamal või täideviival astmel poliitikas 
(Andvig, 2000:13) ja sellele saab viidata kui pisi-korruptsioonile (Tanzi, 1998). 
Sellise korruptsiooni tüübi juures kasutatakse rahalisi makseid korruptsiooni 
vahendina kontoritöötajatele ja teistele ametnikele (Kubbe, 2013) näiteks kesk- 
ja kõrgastme ametnikele. 
Minnes edasi kõrgetasemelise korruptsiooni juurde, saab öelda, et see koosneb 
kahest korruptsiooni liigist: bürokraatlikust ja poliitilisest korruptsioonist (BPK) 
ja poliitilisest korruptsioonist (PK). BPK on endiselt peamiselt rahalistest 
vahenditest kannustatud ja selles osalejad võivad olla ministeeriumite ülemad ja 
majanduslikud osalejad. Sellist laadi korruptsiooni võib oodata erinevate büro-
kraatia ja poliitika tasemete vahel. Teha vahet bürokraatliku ja poliitilise korrupt-
siooni vahel on väga keeruline, sest nende piirjooned ei ole selgelt nähtavad ega 
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teravad, seda eriti mitte-demokraatlikes riikides (Bardhan, 2006). Siiski on tehtud 
uurimusi, mis pakuvad poliitilise ja bürokraatliku korruptsiooni eristamiseks 
definitsioone. Andvig et al (2000) andmetel toimub poliitiline korruptsioon 
poliitilise võimu kõrgeimatel tasemetel, üheks korrumpeerunud tehingute pooleks 
on poliitiline osapool ja poliitikud, kel on õigus kodanike nimel luua ja sisse viia 
seadusi. Seda tüüpi korruptsiooni võib nimetada kõrgetasemeliseks korrupt-
siooniks, sisaldades mitte-rahalisi tegevusi, näiteks teeneid või rahalisi vahen-
deid, näiteks suuri makseid, mõjutamaks kõrgel astmel olevaid poliitika tegijaid 
(Kubbe, 2013) ning sel võib olla väga suur sotsiaalne ja poliitiline hind. 
Arvestades sellega, et korruptsioon on keeruline nähtus, hõlmates erinevaid 
osapooli ja tasemeid, on siiani liiga vähe pööratud tähelepanu erasfääris toimu-
vatele korrumpeerunud suhetele, näiteks majanduslikele osalistele, st firmadele. 
See võib nii olla seetõttu, et korruptsiooni on peetud avalikku sfääri kuuluvaks 
suhteks. Paljud teoreetilised ja empiirilised uurimused on tegelenud korrupt-
siooni päritolu temaatikaga, kui see tuleneb avalikust sfäärist. Seega juhtide 
võimaliku korruptsiooniga seotud otsustusprotsessi uurimisega tegelemine võib 
olla uuenduslik uurimuskäik. Veelgi enam – uurides korruptsiooni ja firma toimi-
mise vahelisi seoseid võib aidata paremini mõista korruptsiooni mõju ettevõtete 
tulemustele. Selliselt käesolev väitekiri annab erasfääri korruptsioonist tervik-
pildi, alustades ettevõtte otsuse langetamisest korruptsiooni kasuks, lõpetades 
sellele järgnenud tagajärgedega ettevõtte majandustulemustele. Seega on selle 
väitekirja eesmärk anda laiapõhjaline arusaam erasfääri korruptsioonist, alus-
tades firmajuhtide otsuse langetamise protsessist ja lõpetades selle tagajärgedega 
firma tulemustele. Era- ja avalik sektor annavad teadmisi, väitekiri pühendub 
esmalt joonise 1 nooltele nr 1, 2 ja 3. Ja viimaks – erasfääri esindajad selles on 
töös erafirmad ja nende juhid. 
Uurides erasfääri korruptsiooni tuleb kaaluda mitmeid erinevaid vaatenurki. 
Need võivad anda väärtuslikku teavet, pidades silmas just erasfääris leiduvaid 
korruptiivseid suhteid. Selles töös keskendun täpsemalt neljale eristatavale suhte-
tasandile seoses korruptsiooni, firmajuhi otsustusprotsessi ja firma tulemustega. 
Konkreetsemalt öeldes, (a) juhi kulude-tulude analüüs vs moraalsed hinnangud 
erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsioonile (I uurimus), (b) juhiomaduste mõju era- 
ja avaliku sektori vahelisele korruptsioonile (II uurimus), (c) altkäemaksu mõju 
firma tulemustele, välis- vs kodumaiste omanikega firmad (III uurimus), (d) eri-
nevat tüüpi korruptsioon ja firma tulemused (IV uurimus). Iga juhtum on just 
seetõttu eriline, et seda saab vaadelda lähtudes juhi otsustusprotsessist, juhi 
isikuomaduste kalduvustest, firma omanikest ja nende omavahelistest seostest 
erinevat tüüpi korruptsiooniga. 
Väitekirja I uurimus tegeleb ärijuhtide arvamustega selle kohta, kuivõrd levinud 
on pistise andmine nende äri valdkonnas ja võimalike selgitustega erasektorilt 
erasektorile korruptsiooni või korporatiivse kuritegevuse kohta. See uurimus 
annab mitmele olulisele valdkonnale uudse panuse. Esiteks tõstab see artikkel 
esile erasfääri sisest ja vahelist korruptsiooni ning erasektorilt erasektorile 
korruptsiooni, mille osapooled on peamiselt erasektori firmad ja mida näit-
likustab nool nr 2 joonisel 1. Vastupidiselt harjumuspärasele arvamusele ei piirdu 
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korruptsioon vaid avaliku ja erasektoriga, see võib esineda ka erafirmade vahel, 
ja sel juhul nimetatakse seda erasektorilt-erasektorile korruptsiooniks (Argan-
doña, 2003). Teiseks näitab see uurimus, et altkäemaksu andmist leidub ka era-
sektorite vahelises korruptsioonis, mitte ainult erasektorilt avalikule sektorile 
suunatud korruptsioonis. Kolmandaks, firmajuhtidel võivad olla väga erinevad 
vaated kaalutlustele ja põhjendustele, miks pistise andmisega erasektorite vahe-
lises korruptsioonis tegeletakse, võrreldes avaliku sektori suunalise korrupt-
siooniga. Neljandaks, andmed, mida empiirilises uuringus kasutatakse, on kogutud 
kahe arenenud riigi, Eesti ja Taani, kohta – mõlemad on pikka aega püsinud 
Transparency International´i korruptsioonitajumise indeksis kõrgel kohal. Eel-
nimetatu on ülimalt oluline, sest korruptsiooni ei vaadelda vaid arengumaades, 
vaid see on oluline teema ka OECD riikides (Hessami, 2014). I uurimus pakub 
välja, et juhid tajuvad korruptsiooni vähem tavalisena, kui nad seostavad seda 
enda moraalsete hinnangute allakäiguga. Pistise andmine võib olla väiksema 
tähtsusega, samal ajal kui pistise saamisest tulenev kasu mängib kogu altkäe-
maksu tajutavas ulatuses marginaalselt rolli. Joonis 2 näitab uuritud suhet tugi-
nedes I uurimuse andmetele. 
 
 
Joonis 2: I uurimuse graafiline kirjeldus.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon. 
 
Mitmed teised uurimused on rõhutanud seost inimese iseloomujoonte, nt Suure 
Viisiku ja ebasotsiaalse käitumise, nt korruptiivse käitumise, vahel (vt nt Van 
Gelder and De Vries, 2012; Wilks et al., 2016; Pletzer et al., 2019). Seega võivad 
olulisteks osutuda ka juhi iseloomujooned, mis mõjutavad tema ärilist tegevust 
samamoodi nagu soov kasutada ebaseaduslikke viise, nagu näiteks korruptiivseid 
tegevusi. Kasutades Vietnami väikeste- ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtete (VKE) 
andmekogu, on selle väitekirja II uurimus asetanud juhi isikuomadused kesksele 
kohale küsides, kas juhiomadustel on mingi mõju juhtidele andmaks avaliku 
sektori ametnikele pistist. See uurimus pöörab tähelepanu seesugustele juhioma-
dustele nagu uuendusmeelsus, isiksuse kontrollkese (usk, et ollakse ise oma õnne 
sepp) ja riskiarmastus, et ennustada, kas on tõenäoline, et nende tõttu ollakse 
kaasatud era- ja avaliku sektori korruptsiooni. Peale selle tegeleb see uurimus 
nende joonte koostoime ja pistise andmise võimalikkusega, et ennustada firma 
tegevustulemusi, nt tööjõu tootlikkust. Tulemused viitavad sellele, et juhi-
omadused nagu riskiarmastus ja uuendusmeelsus on pistise maksmise tõenäo-
susega positiivselt seotud, samal ajal kui juhi isiksuse kontrollkese on pistise 
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maksmise tõenäosusega negatiivselt seotud. Käesolev väitekiri demonstreerib, et 
juhid, kel on riski armastav iseloom ja kes annavad altkäemaksu, on seotud firma 
madalamate tulemustega. Seda võib seletada nii, et ülemäärane riskiarmastus 




Joonis 3: Uurimus II graafiline kirjeldus.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon. 
 
Juhi ja korruptsioonile kalduvuse seoste analüüsi käigus annavad I ja II uurimus 
läbinägelikke uurimistulemusi, mis võivad välja viia tulemuslike poliitika muu-
tusteni. Neis uurimustes on sarnasusi ja erinevusi. Mõlemad keskenduvad eriliselt 
just juhtidele ja nende otsustusprotsesside jälgimisele ja annavad olulist teavet 
korruptiivse erasfääri kohta. Et tagada tervikpilt, on hädavajalik välja selgitada, 
millised tegurid määravad juhtide suhtumise pistisesse ja kogemuse pistisest ning 
kuidas need võiksid olla firma tulemustega seotud. Nende uurimuste põhiline 
erinevus, mis on ühtlasi ka nende peamine uudsus, on erinevate korruptsiooni 
tüüpide kasutamine, mis on ise juba üksteisest nende suhete iseloomu – erasfääri 
sees ning era- ja avaliku sfääri vahel – tõttu erinevad. Peale selle kasutavad I ja 
II uurimus erinevate maade, mil erinev korruptsiooni tase, andmeid, vastavalt 
Eesti-Taani ja Vietnam. III ja IV uurimus erinevad nende vaatenurgast ja uurivad 
edasi korruptsiooni ja firma tulemuste omavahelisi seoseid. 
 
 
Joonis 4: III uurimuse graafiline kirjeldus.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon. 
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III uurimus otsib vastuseid korruptsiooni mõju kohta firma tulemustele, peamiselt 
firma omanditüübi kontekstist lähtudes. See uurimus on vastuseks kahele 
uurimislüngale. Esiteks pole eelmised uurimused konsensuslikult kokkuleppele 
jõudnud, kuidas korrumpeerunud keskkond mõjutab välisinvesteeringuid (Bailey, 
2018; Hitt et al., 2016). Teiseks on tänaseni saanud teemaga seotud kirjanduses 
väga vähe tähelepanu küsimus, kuidas korruptsioon on seostatav firma tule-
mustega, mis on vastavalt siis kas välis- või kodumaiste omanikega. Lisaks püüab 
III uurimus anda selgemaid vastuseid korruptsiooni taseme kohta riikides, kus 
firmad tegutsevad. Kasutades ettevõtluskeskkonna ja ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse 
uuringu (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) viiendat 
vooru näitab III uurimus, et välismaiste omanikega firmades makstakse tõe-
näoliselt suuremaid pistiseid kui kodumaiste omanikega firmades, kuigi samal 
ajal on pistisele kulutatud summade negatiivne mõju ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele/ 
tootlikkusele välismaiste omanikega firmade puhul suurem kui kodumaiste 




Joonis 5: IV uurimuse graafiline kirjeldus.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon. 
 
Nagu III uurimuses analüüsitud, võivad seosed korruptsiooni ja firma tulemus-
likkuse vahel sõltuda firmade erinevatest omadustest. Seega rõhutab III uurimus 
pigem firmapoolset, uurides rohkem firma tulemuslikkuse, omanike ja asukohaga 
seotud jooni. Uurimus IV aga keskendub enam korruptsioonile ja mitte firma 
omadustele. Varasemad uurimused on tõstnud esile, et korruptsioonitüüp võib 
olla seotud firma tulemustega (Harstad and Svensson, 2011; Seker ja Yang, 
2014). Kuna korruptsioonil võib olla mitmeid erinevaid kujusid ja selle iseloom, 
nõudluse ja pakkumise koosmõju, erinev läbirääkimiste jõud peegeldavad eri-
nevaid firma tulemusi. Niisiis kasutades ettevõtluskeskkonna ja ettevõtte tule-
muslikkuse uuringu viiendat vooru, eristab IV uurimus erinevaid korruptsiooni 
tasandeid, nagu näiteks poliitilist korruptsiooni, bürokraatlikku korruptsiooni, 
kogemusi ja vaateid pistisele, ning analüüsib nende suhet firma tulemustesse. 
IV uurimuse tulemused näitavad, et poliitiline korruptsioon ja bürokraatlik 
korruptsioon on firma tulemuslikkusega positiivselt seotud. Lisaks avaldas uuri-
mus IV, et korruptsiooni tajumise ja korruptsiooni kogemise ulatus on firma 
tulemuslikkusega positiivselt seotud. See uurimus ütleb, et kuna korruptsioonil 
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on mitmeid tahke, peaksid poliitika tegijad neid erinevaid dimensioone silmas 
pidades välja arendama korruptsioonivastased meetmed. 
 
 
Joonis 6: Ülevaade: Uurimuste kujutamine väitekirjas.  
Allikas: Autori illustratsioon. 
 
Joonis nr 6 seob omavahel I, II, III ja IV uurimuse ning vastavad joonised, nr 2, 
3, 4 ja 5, mis koos moodustavad uurimuste kujutamise väitekirjas. See doktoritöö 
uurib sügavuti erasfääri korruptiivsete suhete aluseid. Kokkuvõtteks saab öelda, 
et sel uurimusel on kaks peamist uuritavat – kuidas korruptsiooniga tegelema 
hakatakse ja millised on korruptsiooniga tegelemise tagajärjed. Protsessi saab 
kirjeldada kui juhi otsustamise ja valikute tegemise protsessi, hakates tegelema 
avalikust sektorist erasektorile suunatud või erasektorite vahelise korruptsiooniga 
ja seda on vaadeldud I ja II uurimuses. Tulemused viitavad peamiselt nende 
tegevuste tagajärgede analüüsile, püütakse leida vastuseid, kuidas korruptsioon 
on seotud ettevõtte tulemustega, võttes arvesse erinevaid korruptsiooni liike ja 
ettevõttega seotud erisusi. Lühidalt öeldes, neis uurimustes hinnatakse, mille abil 
otsustavad juhid korruptsioonis osaleda ja kuidas nende otsused mõjutavad firma 
tulemusi erasfääri korruptiivses vastastikmõjus. 
 
 
Uurimuste eesmärgid ja ülesanded 
Seosed juhtide, korruptsiooni ja firma tulemuste vahel on selles töös selgelt esile 
tõstetud, kuid hinnata, mil määral ja suurusjärgus need seosed olulised on, ei ole 
kerge ülesanne. Suurim väljakutse on hinnata korruptsiooni suurust, sest korrupt-
sioon on ebaseaduslik ja peamiselt varjatud tegevus. Seega on korruptsiooni 
mõõtmine ja selle seoste ning suhete üles leidmine erinevate muutujate vahel alati 
väga keeruline olnud. Mitmed uurimused on kasutanud kindlaid meetodeid, et 
nendest probleemidest üle saada, niisiis olen oma uurimuste muutujad nende toel 
modelleerinud. Järgmises osas on nendest abinõudest pikemalt juttu. Seesugused 
väljakutsed toovad endaga lisaks huvitavatele külgedele kaasa ka uusi uurimus-
tühimikke. Igas uurimuses olen proovinud konkreetseid uurimustühimikke täita. 
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Selle väitekirja eesmärgiks on anda põhjalik ülevaade korruptsiooni isikliku-
mast poolest – firmajuhi otsuse langetamise protsessist kuni tagajärgedeni, mida 
see endaga firma tegevusele kaasa toob. Eelnevad uurimused on erasfääri 
korruptsiooni käsitlenud kui koostöö ohvrit, ning võrreldes erasfääriga on just 
avalik sfäär saanud enim tähelepanu (Galang, 2012). Vaatamata sellele on era-
sfääri korrumpeerunud suhted keerulised ja vajavad tõsist uurimist. On ülioluline 
mõista, missugused sisemised ja välimised mõjurid viivad juhte nii kaugele, et 
nad puutuvad kokku korruptsiooniga ja seovad end ise korruptiivsete prakti-
katega (De Jong et al., 2012). Lisaks on samavõrra oluline uurida kuidas juhtide 
korruptiivne seotus on seotud firma tulemustega. Käesoleva väitekirja empiiri-
lised uurimused heidavad uut valgust erasfääri korruptiivsetele suhetele. See-
juures on rangemaks analüüsimiseks tehtud palju eristusi ja klassifikatsioone. 
 
Saavutamaks väitekirja eesmärke, on sõnastatud konkreetsed uurimisülesanded: 
1) Sünteesida teoreetilisi korruptsiooni eeldusi, võttes arvesse juhtide otsustus-
protsessi ja ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse omavahelisi seoseid. 
2) Esitada asjakohast akadeemilist kirjandust korruptsiooni ulatuse kohta. 
3) Uurida riikidevahelisi korruptsiooniga seotud erinevusi. 
4) Sünteesida empiirilist kirjandust, mis kirjeldab korruptsiooni, juhtide otsustus-
protsessi ja firma tulemuslikkuse omavahelisi seoseid. 
a. Täpsustada juhtide ja korruptsiooni omavahelist seost. 
b. Arutleda vastuolude üle, mis on seotud korruptsiooni tagajärgedega firma 
tulemuslikkusele: nn atta õlitamise või liivatamise efekt (grease versus 
sand the wheele effect). 
c. Võrrelda korruptsiooni erinevaid mõjusid sõltuvalt firmaomanikest: välis- 
vs kodumaised omanikud. 
d. Uurida korruptsioonitüüpide ja firma tulemuslikkuse omavahelisi seoseid. 
5) Viia läbi empiirilised uuringud. (3. peatükk) 
6) Esitada uurimuste kokkuvõte ja arutleda tulemuste üle. 
7) Pakkuda välja praktilisi järeldusi/soovitusi. 
8) Kirjeldada tulevaste uurimuste kitsendusi ja edasiuurimise võimalusi. 
 
Uurimisülesanded on loodud lõputöö katuse moodustamiseks ja nende nelja uuri-
muse tutvustamiseks ühises kontekstis. Uurimisülesanded, mis on katuspeatüki 
jaoks loodud, ei sisalda kõiki ülesandeid, nagu näiteks kirjanduse ülevaadet, uuri-
musküsimuste moodustamise protsessi, andmete kogumise ja nende analüüsiga 
seonduvat ega ökonomeetrilist analüüsi. Uurimisülesanded on tehtud nähtavaks 
vastava andmestiku ja metodoloogia kõrval tabelis nr 2. 
 
 
Uurimuste andmestik ja meetod 
Käesolevas doktoritöös hinnatakse firmajuhi, korruptsiooni ja firma tulemuste 
vaheliste suhete erinevaid aspekte. Iga seos nõuab põhjalikku analüüsi, mis 
tugineks piisavalt suurele ja laialt kasutatavale andmekogule. On vajalik öelda, 
et iga uurimuse jaoks kasutati erinevaid andmekogusid erinevatest riikidest. 
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I uurimuses kasutasin sellise uuringu andmeid, mis oli kavandatud mõõtmaks 
erasektori korruptsiooni põhjuseid, ulatust ja vorme kahes Põhja-Euroopa riigis, 
Taanis ja Eestis6. Uuringut viidi läbi 2015. aasta augustis, osalejaid oli mõlemast 
riigist 500, mis tähendab, et lõplikku valimisse kuulus 1000 juhti. Kasutatud 
proportsionaalse valimi meetod (stratified random sampling method / proportional 
random sampling) tagas selle, et mõlemast riigist oli valimis piisav arv inimesi 
erasektori ettevõtetest, mil sama suurus, tegevusvaldkond ja piirkondlikkus. 
Uuringu tarbeks, mis telliti TNS Emorilt (praeguse nimega Kantar Emor), loodi 
ettevõtete registripõhine andmebaas, mis hõlmas kõiki Eestis ja Taanis olevaid 
ettevõtteid. Vastajate positsioon sõltus firma suurusest. Väikeste ja keskmise 
suurusega firmade puhul (2 kuni 29 töötajat) intervjueeriti ainult tippjuhte. Suure-
mate firmade puhul olid pooled vastanutest tippjuhid ja pooled keskastmejuhid, 
tavaliselt finantsjuhid või tippjuhi alluvuses töötavad haldusjuhid. Vaatamata 
sellele ei muutnud vastajate positsioon märkimisväärselt ühtki uurimuse all 
olevat muutujat. 
II uuring kasutas Vietnami mikro, väikeste ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtete 
uuringut, mis viidi Vietnamis 2015. aasta suvel eraettevõtete omanike/juhtidega 
küsitluse kujul läbi. Uuringut korraldasid koos Central Institute for Economic 
Management (CIEM), Tööteaduse ja Sotsiaalküsimuste Instituut (Institute of 
Labour Science and Social Affairs) (ILSSA), Development Economics Research 
Group (DERG) Kopenhaageni Ülikoolist ja UNU-WIDER. Uuringus on kasu-
tatud üheksa Vietnami provintsi andmeid: Hanoi (koos Ha Tay´ga), Hai Phong, 
Ho Chi Minh´i linn, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong ja 
Long An. Uuring annab ettevõtete kohta mitmekesist informatsiooni, firma tule-
muslikkuse, ajaloo, tööhõive, ettevõtluskeskkonna, omaniku/juhi taustanäitajate 
ja finantsnäitajate, st tulude, kulude, varade ja kohustuste kohta. Tootvate era-
ettevõtete arv eelnimetatud provintsides on võetud kahest allikast Vietnami 
statistikaametist (General Statistics Office of Vietnam) (GSO): (i) 2002. aasta 
asutamisloendusest (Establishment Census) ja; (i) 2004–2006 Tööstusuuringust 
(Industrial Survey). Proportsionaalset valimit kasutati selleks, et kindlustada 
piisav arv ettevõtteid iga provintsi kohta, mil oleksid erinevad omandivormid 
(pereettevõtted, füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjad, ühistud, äriühingud ja aktsiaseltsid). 
III ja IV uurimus kasutasid firmataseme ristandmete andmestikku, ettevõtlus-
keskkonna ja ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse uuringu (Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey) viienda vooru tulemusi (BEEPS V), mida korral-
dasid Euroopa Rekonstruktsiooni- ja Arengupank (European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development) (EBRD) ja Maailmapan (World Bank Group). 
Intervjueeriti kõrgetasemelisi valimi esindajaid, juhuslikul teel valitud 15 500 
firma juhti 29st riigist. BEEPS´i on läbi viidud viis korda (1999, 2002, 2005, 2009 
                                                                          
6  See uuring kutsuti ellu osana projektist “Reducing Corruption: Focusing on Private Sector 
Corruption” (HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/FINEC/4000005200), seda kaasrahastas Eesti Justiits-
ministeerium ja Euroopa Liidu programm “Prevention of and Fight against Crime Prog-
ramme” (ISEC). Andmestik on avalikult kättesaadav lehel:  
http://www.korruptsioon.ee/en/node/28537 
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ja 2012–2014). III ja IV uurimus kasutavad ainult viiendat versiooni, mis on 
kõige esinduslikum uuringu versioon. Tuleb öelda, et selle uuringu käigus ei tehtud 
paneelandmete analüüsi, kuna eri aastate jooksul kattusid uuritavad ettevõtted 
vähe ja uuringu küsimustik varieerus oluliselt üle aastate. Käesolev uuring 
sisaldab rikkalikku sisendit empiiriliseks analüüsiks, andes ettevõtete kohta palju 
teavet, muu hulgas taristu, teenuste, müügi, tarnete, konkurentsi, innovatsiooni ja 
eriti arusaamadest ettevõtete ja valitsuse suhete kohta. Nendest küsimustest 
moodustatakse korruptsiooniga seotud küsimusi ja empiirilisel analüüsil on 
sellest andmestikust väga palju kasu olnud. 
Joonis 7: Väitekirjas käsitletud maade kaart.  
Allikas: Autori koostatud, tuginedes 2018. aasta Transparency International’i korruptsiooni-
tajumise indeksile. 
 
Joonis nr 7 illustreerib väitekirjas käsitletud maid. Võib öelda, et käsitletud on kõik 
maad, mis on joonisel 7 välja joonistatud. Nagu joonisel 7 näha võib, on III ja IV 
uurimus kasutanud andmekogusid, mis on pärit järgnevatest riikidest: Albaania, 
Aserbaidžaan, Valgevene, Tšehhi, Eesti, Gruusia, Kosovo, endine Jugoslaavia 
Makedoonia Vabariik, Slovakkia, Armeenia, Venemaa, Kasahstan, Kõrgõzstan, 
Usbekistan, Ukraina, Türgi, Tadžikistan, Läti, Leedu, Poola, Sloveenia, Kreeka, 
Bulgaaria, Montenegro, Küpros, Ungari, Serbia, Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina ning 
Moldova. Lisaks on I uurimuses kasutatud andmekogusid, mis on kogutud kahest 
Euroopa Liidu riigist, Taanist ja Eestist, saal ajal kui II uurimuses on kasutatud 
Vietnami väikeste ja keskmiste ettevõtete andmekogusid. 
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Tabel 2: Väitekirjas kasutatud uurimismeetodite ülevaade 
UURIMUS ÜLESANNE (ÜL) ANDMESTIK MEETOD 
I ÜL 1: Uurida erasektorilt erasektorile 
korruptsiooni ja saada aimu ettevõtete juhtide 
arusaamast korruptsiooni suurusest nende 
vastutusalas. 
ÜL 2: Võrrelda kaht käitumisega seotud 
korruptsiooni põhjust: ratsionaalse valiku 
teooriat ja kognitiivse tegutsemise teooriat. 
ÜL 3: Hinnata nende teooriate ja erasektorilt 
erasektorile korruptsiooni seoste tähtsuse 
suurust. 










II ÜL 4: Arutleda juhtide isikuomaduste tähtsuse 
üle pidades silmas ettevõtete tulemuslikkust.  
ÜL 5: Heita valgust võimalikele seostele juhi 
isikuomaduste ja ebaseadusliku käitumise 
vahel, nt kalduvusele olla korrumpeerunud. 
ÜL 6: Uurida seoseid ettevõtete esindajate 
käitumise ja isikuomaduste ning pistise 
andmise vahel, Vietnami juhtumipõhises 
uuringus. 
ÜL 7: Uurida, kas korruptsioon on seotud 















III ÜL 8: Uurida korruptsiooni ja 
välisinvesteeringute vahelist seost. 
ÜL 9: Uurida firmade pistise maksmise 
proportsioone vastavalt ettevõtete 
omanditüübile. 
ÜL 10: Analüüsida seoseid pistisele kulutatud 
summa ja firma tulemuste vahel. 
ÜL 11: Uurida, kas riikide korruptsiooni tase 
on seotud firmade erineva tulemuslikkusega 
ja kas pistisele kulutatud raha suurus oleneb 



















IV ÜL 12: Arutleda korruptsiooni erinevate 
tasemete eristamise olulisuse üle. 
ÜL 13: Täpsustada suhteid erinevate tasemete 
vahel ja kuidas need omavahel suhestuvad.  
ÜL 14: Uurida seoseid korruptsiooni tasemete 


















Uurimuse meetodid on valitud vastavalt uurimusküsimustele ja mudelile. I uuri-
muses kasutan kinnitavat faktorianalüüsi (confirmatory factor analysis) ja struk-
tuurivõrrandi modelleerimise hindamistehnikat (structural equation modelling 
estimation technique). II, III ja IV uurimuses olen seoste uurimiseks kasutanud 
erinevaid ökonomeetrilisi strateegiaid. Täpsemalt on II uurimuses kasutanud 
probit ja tavalise vähimruutude meetodit, et hinnata uurimuse hüpoteese. III uuri-
mus kasutab logit mudelit ja tavalist vähimruutude meetodit. Lisaks neile meeto-
ditele, eesmärgil endogeensuse kahtlustele/ohtudele vastata, kasutatakse empiiri-
lises analüüsis kaheastmelist vähimruutude meetodit (two stage least squares 
instrumental variable method). Viimasena, kuid mitte väheolulisena – IV uuri-
mus on kasutanud struktuurivõrrandi modelleerimise hindamistehnikat ja kahe-
astmelise vähimruutude instrumentmuutuja meetodit. 
 
Arutelu ja järeldused: Uurimuste kokkuvõte  
Korruptsioon toimub kahe sfääri: era- ja avaliku sfääri osalemisel. Eelnevatel 
töödel on olnud kalduvus keskenduda sellisele korruptsioonile, mida alustab ja 
veab avalik sfäär ning mis on suunatud erasfäärile. Sellised lähenemised ei ole aga 
suutnud mitmele väga olulisele seesuguse suhtega seotud küsimusele vastuseid 
anda: 1. Korruptsioon võib aset leida ka erasfääris, 2. Juhi moraalsete kaalutluste 
rolli seosed erasektorilt erasektorile toimuvas korruptsioonis, 3. Juhiomaduste olu-
lisus era- ja avaliku sfääri korruptsiooni sekkumisel, 4. Omanditüübi rolli korrupt-
siooniga vastavuses olemine (era- ja avaliku sfääri vahel), 5. Korruptsiooniliigid 
ja nende seos firma majandustulemustega. Niisiis see väitekiri on nende teemadega 
tegelenud ning täitnud sellega korruptsiooniuuringutes olnud uurimislünga. 
Väitekiri uuris neid teemasid keskendudes kahele etapile: 1. Juhtide otsustus-
protsessile eelnev, kui kaalutakse, kas osaleda korruptsioonis või mitte, mõlema, 
nii erasektorilt erasektorile kui ka erasektorilt avalikule sektorile suunatud 
korruptsiooni puhul. 2. Korruptsiooni tagajärjed firma tulemustele, arvestades 
erinevate sätetega. Sellega proovib see väitekiri anda erasfääri korruptsioonist 
tervikpildi, mis saab alguse korruptsioonile eelneva otsustusprotsessiga ja lõpeb 
tagajärgedega firma tulemustele. Selle väitekirja eesmärgiks on anda põhjalik 
ülevaade korruptsiooni isiklikumast poolest – firmajuhi otsuse langetamise 
protsessist kuni tagajärgedeni, mida see endaga firma tegevusele kaasa toob. 
Viimaseks, selles väitekirjas esineavad erasfääri erafirmad ja nende juhid. 
Väitekiri hõlmab nelja erinevat artiklit ja igaüks neist heidab valgust erine-
vatele vaatenurkadele, mida erasfääri korruptsiooni uurides silmas pidada. Need 
erinevad vaatenurgad võivad lisada erasfääri korruptiivsete suhete uurimisele 
väärtusust. Täpsemalt selles väitekirjas rõhutan ma korruptsiooni, firmajuhi 
otsustusprotsessi ja firma tulemustega seotud suhete erinevaid tasandeid. Konk-
reetsemalt öeldes, (a) juhi kulude-tulude analüüs vs moraalsed hinnangud era-
sektorilt erasektorile korruptsioonile (I uurimus), (b) juhiomaduste mõju era- ja 
avaliku sektori vahelisele korruptsioonile (II uurimus), (c) altkäemaksu mõju 
firma tulemustele, välis- vs kodumaiste omanikega firmad (III uurimus), (d) eri-
nevat tüüpi korruptsioon ja firma tulemused (IV uurimus). Seega on iga juhtum 
175 
just seetõttu eriline, et seda saab vaadelda lähtudes juhi otsustusprotsessist, juhi 
isikuomaduste kalduvustest, firma omanikest ja nende omavahelistest seostest 
erinevat tüüpi korruptsiooniga. 
Uurimuste tulemused näitavad, et sisemised seosed korruptsiooni, juhi ja firma 
vahel on keerulised ning nende erinevad küljed on teatud tegurite ja ajendite 
suhtes tundlikud. Uurimisülesanded on välja töötatud eelnevate empiiriliste ja 
teoreetiliste eelduste põhjal ning käsitletud empiirilisele analüüsile tuginedes. 
Juhtide kalduvuse altkäemaksus osalemise algsete tegurite empiiriline tuvasta-
mine aitab meil hinnata eelnevalt tähelepanuta jäänud tegureid, mis mõjutavad 
juhte otsuse langetamisel. Veelgi enam, korruptsiooni (ja selle tasemete) ja firma 
tulemuslikkuse vaheliste suhete empiiriline uurimine lubab meil uurida selle 
suhte varem tähelepanuta jäänud kaht poolt. Tabel nr 4 sisaldab endas uurimus-
ülesandeid ja nende tulemusi. Tulemused sisaldavad ka hinnangutest lähtuvaid 
järeldusi. 
 
Kulud, tulud ja moraalsete hinnangute roll erasektorilt erasektorile 
korruptsioonis (I uurimus) 
Korruptsioon on keeruline nähtus ja korruptsiooniuuringud on peamiselt piirdunud 
era- ja avaliku sektori vahelise korruptsiooni uurimisele. Lisaks on tavaliselt 
kasutatud ratsionaalse valiku teooriat selleks, et selgitada üksikisiku kalduvust 
end korruptsiooniga siduda. Suur osa korruptsiooniuuringuid käsitlevast kirjan-
dusest keskendub tavaliselt arengumaadele, mille korruptsioonitajumise indeks 
on madalamal astmel (madalam positsioon tähendab, et riik on korrumpeeru-
num), kuna need pakuvad korruptsiooniuuringuteks laia valdkonda. Ka arenenud 
riigid on pakkunud erinevaid võimalusi korruptsiooni uurimiseks, näiteks era-
sektorilt erasektorile korruptsioon. Kuna I uurimus keskendub kahele arenenud 
riigile, Eestile ja Taanile, loodetakse leevendada teiste uuringute seesuguste 
riikide mittekaasamise probleemi. Selle lünga täitmiseks oli I uurimuse eesmärk 
välja selgitada kulude, tulude ja moraalsete hinnangute rolli erasektorilt era-
sektorile korruptsioonis Taanis ja Eestis (uurimisülesanded 1, 2, 3 on välja toodud 
tabelis nr 4). See töö rikastab olemasolevaid teadmisi korruptsioonist, uurides 
erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsiooni ning pakkudes põhjalikumat sissevaadet 
olemasolevate teooriate selgitusjõule erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsiooni kohta. 
Taani ja Eesti juhtide valimi abil rõhutavad I uuringu järeldused, et instrumen-
taalne ratsionaalsus või ratsionaalse valiku teooria ei ole suutnud selgitada 
erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsiooni, kuid kognitiivsel ratsionaalsusel on märki-
misväärne selgitav jõud. Täpsemalt öeldes oli altkäemaksuga seotud isiklik 
moraalne hinnang tihedalt seotud altkäemaksu võtmise tajumisega töökesk-
konnas, samal ajal kui altkäemaksuga seotud kulud ja eelised ei olnud enam olu-
lised. Ratsionaalse valiku teooria väidab, et kulud ja tulud on peamised tegurid, 
mis mõjutavad inimese tahet ja käitumist enda sidumisel korruptsiooniga. See-
tõttu ei pruugi kasulikkuse olulisimaks pidamine olla korruptiivsete tegudega 
sidumise ennustajaks. Isiklikud moraalsed hinnangud pistise andmisele ja 
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võtmisele on olulisemad, kui otsustatakse end siduda erasektorilt erasektorile 
korruptsiooniga.  
Esineb kaks tõenäolist põhjust, miks juhtide kavatsused ja käitumine võimalike 
korruptsiooniga seotud kulude suhtes on ebaoluline. Esiteks on erasektorilt 
erasektorile korruptsiooni puudutavate tõendite avastamine keeruline (Mansikka-
mäki ja Muttilainen 2016). See teeb sise- või välisjuurdluse algatamise keeru-
liseks, sest keegi ei pruugi jätta korruptsioonist jälgi. Seetõttu muretseksid juhid 
vähem oma korruptiivsete seoste ja võimalike kulude pärast. Teiseks, paljud 
prokurörid ei esita üksikisikute vastu nn valgekraelike kuritegude eest süüdistusi 
(Mishra, 2006) ja seega on väiksem tõenäosus, et organisatsioonid seisaksid 
silmitsi heidutavate süüdistustega (Holmes, 2009; Hulpke, 2017). Seega ei pruugi 
kuludega seotud kaalutlused olla peamised mured, kui end töökeskkonnas eba-
seaduslike tegevustega seotakse. 
 
Juhiomaduste mõju firmatasandi korruptsioonile:  
tõendus Vietnamist (II uurimus) 
Juhi otsustusprotsessi tegurid avaliku ja erasektori korruptsioonis. II uuringu 
kontekstis viitab korruptsioon peamiselt pistise maksmisele. Seni on kirjanduses 
domineerinud pistise maksmine avalikus sfääris ja korruptsioon erasfääris on 
pälvinud vähem tähelepanu. Peamiseks põhjuseks võib olla see, et korruptsiooni 
erasfääri on peetud nende ebaseaduslike tegevuste ohvriks. Vietnami andmestiku 
kasutamine võimaldab meil saada rohkem teavet erasfääri korralduse kohta riigis, 
kus korruptsioon on laialt levinud ja kus see on osa ärikliimast. Seetõttu keskendub 
II uuring avaliku sektori ametnikega seotud korruptsioonisuhete privaatsfäärile, 
uurides juhtkonna isiksuseomaduste rolli olulisust korruptiivsetes suhetes (vas-
tavad uurimisülesanded 4, 5, 6 ja 7 on välja toodud tabelis nr 4). Selle uurimuse 
empiirilised järeldused annavad uusi arusaamu juhi otsustusprotsessi määravatest 
teguritest, analüüsides juhiomaduste ja korruptsioonile kaldumise suhteid. Lisaks 
altkäemaksu ja juhiomaduste vaheliste tingimuste tutvustamisele, on II uuringu 
eesmärgiks uurida, kas ettevõtte tulemuslikkust mõjutavad juhid, kel on konk-
reetsed korruptsioonile kalduvad isiksuseomadused. 
II uuringust selgus, et uuendusmeelsetel juhtidel on pigem tõenäoline end 
altkäemaksuga siduda. Võimalik seletus sellele võib olla selline, et juhilt ooda-
takse uuenduslikkust ettevõtte tootlikkuse, seega ka kasumi parandamisel. Seoseid 
võib näha selles, et korruptsioon on varjatud tegevus ja see nõuab uusi viise alt-
käemaksu saajatega ühenduse loomiseks ja mitteametlike maksete tegemiseks. 
Juhi uuenduslikkusele kaldumine võib aidata tal leida uusi ja alternatiivseid viise, 
kuidas ebaseaduslikke toiminguid läbi viia. Juhtidel, kes armastavad riski, on 
suurem tõenäosus pistise maksmisega kokku puutuda kui riski kartvatel juhtidel. 
Seda võiks seletada faktiga, et juhtidel on kalduvus eelistada riskantseid otsuseid, 
ning suurema tootlikkuse nimel võivad nad investeerida ka riskantsetesse ette-
võtmistesse. Lisaks on korruptsioon ebaseaduslik ja riskantne tegevus, seetõttu 
võib riski armastavatel juhtidel olla suurem tõenäosus ettevõtte tootlikkuse 
tõstmiseks altkäemaksu maksta. Kuid juhtidel, kel on rangem sisekontroll või 
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isiksuse kontrollkese, on madalam tõenäosus ettevõtte tulemuste parandamiseks 
mitteametlikke makseid teha. Viimaks, juhid, kel on riski armastavad isikuoma-
dused ja kes seovad end altkäemaksu maksmisega, on seotud ettevõtte madalama 
tulemuslikkusega. Ehkki riski armastav loomus tõstab altkäemaksu maksmise 
tõenäosust, võib öelda, et liigselt riskeeriv käitumine ei pruugi ettevõtte tulemuste 
jaoks positiivselt mõjuda, selle asemel võib see ettevõtte tulemusi hoopis 
kahjustada. 
Kokkuvõtvalt saab öelda, et I ja II uurimus annavad meile uusi teadmisi 
korruptsioonist era- ja avaliku sfääri vahel ning erasfääri sees, osutades juhtimis-
kaalutlustele ja isikuomaduste rollile otsustusprotsessis. Nende uurimuste järel-
dused rikastavad mitmeti olemasolevat erialakirjandust. Kui I uurimus paljastas 
erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsiooniga tegelemisele eelnenud kaalumismehha-
nisme, annab teisena nimetatu ülevaate juhiomaduste rollist erasektorilt avalikule 
sektorile suunatud korruptsioonis ning selle võimalikest tagajärgedest ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusele. Need kaks artiklit koos pakkusid ainulaadse ja uudse viisi 
juhtide otsustusprotsessi uurimiseks kahes erinevas keskkonnas, esiteks uuriti 
arenenud riikides, Taanis ja Eestis erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsiooni ning siis 
siirdemajandusega riigis, Vietnamis erasektorilt avalikule sektorile suunatud 
korruptsiooni. Lisaks on III ja IV uurimus keskendunud korruptsiooni ja firma 
tulemuslikkuse seostele, võttes arvesse siirdemajandusega riikide eripärasid. 
 
Kas korruptsioon mõjutab kodumaiste ja välismaiste omanikega  
firmasid erinevalt? Tõendus BEEPS’i uuringust (III uurimus). 
Korruptsiooniga seotud uurimustes on üks olulisemaid arutelukäike see, kas 
korrumpeerunud keskkond on seotud välisinvesteeringutega. Ja kui see on nii, 
siis kas see on välisinvesteeringute jaoks positiivne või negatiivne asi. Seniajani 
on liiga vähe tähelepanu pööratud sellele, kuidas korruptsioon on seotud välis-
maiste ja kodumaiste omanikega ettevõtete tulemuslikkusele. Sellest lähtuvalt on 
III uurimuse eesmärgiks olnud see tühimik täita, panustades ulatuslikult kahte 
erinevasse väheuuritud korruptsiooniga seotud erialakirjanduse teemasse. Täpse-
malt on III uurimusel lausa kaks eesmärki: esiteks uuritakse, kas sihtriikides on 
seoseid välismaiste otseinvesteeringute ja altkäemaksu vahel. Teiseks uuritakse 
eraldi altkäemaksu seoseid ja välis- ja kodumaiste omanikega firmade toot-
likkust. Varasemad uuringud on näidanud, et koduriigi asutuste mõjuvõim on 
oluliseks tõukejõuks ettevõtete investeeringutele sihtriikidesse (vt nt Estrin et al., 
2016). Päritoluriigi ja sihtriigi korruptiivsete tegude vaheline kaugus võib olla 
kõrgelt korrumpeerunud sihtriikides välismaiste otseinvesteeringute jaoks oluline 
tegur (Godinez & Liu, 2015). Vähem korrumpeerunud riikide ettevõtted ei pruugi 
eelistada investeerimist väga korrumpeerunud riikidesse (Karhunen ja Ledyaeva, 
2012). Sellest tulenevalt vaadeldakse selles uurimuses riigi korruptsioonitaseme 
mõju altkäemaksuga seotud toimingutele ning välis- ja kodumaiste omanikega 
ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse vahelisi seoseid (seotud uurimisülesanded 8, 9, 10 ja 
11 on välja toodud tabelis nr 4). Selles töös on kasutatud firmataseme ristandmete 
andmestikku, ettevõtluskeskkonna ja ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse uuringu (BEEPS) 
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viienda vooru andmeid, mis hõlmavad peamiselt postkommunistlikke riike. See 
uuring on empiiriliseks analüüsiks sobiv, kuna see sisaldab üksikasjalikku teavet 
ettevõtete, muu hulgas taristu, teenuste, müügi, tarnete, konkurentsi, innovat-
siooni ja eriti arusaamadest ettevõtete ja valitsuse suhete kohta. 
Selles uuringus kasutatakse logistilist regressiooni ja IV 2SLS-i hindamis-
tehnikaid, et eelnimetatud seostele hinnang anda. Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et 
pistise maksmine on ettevõtte tootlikkusega negatiivselt seotud. Negatiivse seose 
ulatus muutub välismaiste omanikega ettevõtete tootlikkusele suuremaks kui 
kodumaiste omanikega ettevõtete omale väga korrumpeerunud riikides. See 
tähendab, et välismaiste omanikega ettevõtted kannatavad pistisele tehtavate 
kulutuste tõttu tõsisemalt kui kodumaised ettevõtted. Võimalik seletus sellele 
võib olla see, et kodumaiste ettevõtete omanikud tunnevad kohalikku korrum-
peerunud keskkonda ja korrumpeerunud riigiametnikke paremini ja see võimal-
dab neil leevendada pistisele kuluva maksumuse negatiivset mõju nende ette-
võtete tulemuslikkusele. Lisaks võib öelda, et laialt levinud korruptsioon riigis 
võib välisinvestorite turult väljatõrjumisega tegelikult mõjutada turul valitsevat 
konkurentsi. Vastasel juhul võiksid välisinvestorid kohaneda kohalike normidega 
ja käituda vastavalt mängureeglitele ja jääda kõrgelt korrumpeerunud riiki. 
 
Korruptsiooni erinevad tasemed ja firma tulemuslikkus:  
BEEPS’i uuringu empiiriline analüüs (IV uurimus). 
Sarnaselt III uurimusele uurib IV uurimus seoseid korruptsiooni ja ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkuse vahel. III uurimus on välja töötatud võimalikud investeeringutega 
seotud riikide ettevõtete omaduste ja eripärade potentsiaalsed edasiviivad tegurid, 
kuna need võivad mõjuda ettevõtte tulemustele. Seevastu keskendub IV uurimus 
korruptsioonile ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse ja korruptsiooni vahelistes seostes, 
eristades korruptsioonitüüpe ja analüüsides nende võimalikku mõju ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusele. Sel moel võivad need kaks artiklit anda üsna selge pildi 
korruptsiooni ja ettevõtte tegevuste seostest, uurides põhjalikult suhte mõlemat 
poolt. (Uurimisülesanded, st ülesanne 12, 13, 14 on välja toodud tabelis nr 4). 
Varasemad uuringud on püüdnud uurida erinevaid korruptsiooniliike nagu 
poliitilist korruptsiooni, altkäemaksu ja bürokraatlikku korruptsiooni erinevates 
kontekstides, kuid üheski uuringus pole neid kolme mõõdet uuritud kõrvuti, nagu 
seda on tehtud selles uurimuses postkommunistlike riikide kontekstis. BEEPS-i 
uuring võimaldab meil selles uurida samaaegselt korruptsiooni erinevate tase-
mete mõju ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele. Kuna kasutatud andmestik pakub väga 
detailset teavet ettevõtete ja valitsuste suhete kohta, esitades selleks spetsiaalselt 
kavandatud küsimusi, näiteks vaateid poliitikale ja poliitilistele seostele siirde-
majandusega riikides. Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et selle uuringu eesmärk oli 
uurida korruptsiooni erinevate tasemete omavahelisi seoseid ja analüüsida 
korruptsiooni erinevate tasemete mõju ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele. 
Selle uuringu tulemused ütlevad, et bürokraatial on tihe seos altkäemaksu 
maksmise sageduse ja poliitilise korruptsiooniga. Ka poliitilisel korruptsioonil on 
küllaltki tugev seos altkäemaksu maksmisega. Seetõttu võib öelda, et kuigi iga 
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korruptsiooni tase näib olevat erinev, on nende vahel seosed. Teisest küljest näi-
tavad tulemused, et poliitiline korruptsioon on positiivselt seotud ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusega. Seda võib seletada asjaoluga, et ettevõtted võivad oma tege-
vuse ja tulemuslikkuse parandamiseks ära kasutada oma poliitilisi sidemeid. 
Veelgi enam – bürokraatia või bürokraatlik korruptsioon on ettevõtte tulemus-
likkusega positiivselt seotud. Korrates eelnevat võib öelda, et riigiametnikel on 
võimalik tahtlikult kehtestada mitmesuguseid blokeeringuid ja tingimusi, et 
panna ettevõtteid altkäemaksu maksma, enne, kui ettevõtetele antakse luba 
pääseda mõne võtmeprojekti juurde või tagatakse luba konkreetsetele toodetele.  
Seetõttu võivad korrumpeerunud riikide ettevõtted eelistada rangetest bürok-
raatlikest protseduuridest hoidumiseks altkäemaksu maksmist või riigiametnike 
soovide rahuldamist. See lahendus võib kiirendada ettevõtte tegevust ja on 
jälgitav, et bürokraatlikul korruptsioonil on teatud positiivne mõju ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusele. Aga see paremuselt teine lahendus võib küll lühiajaliselt olla 
kasulik, kuid seda mitte pikas perspektiivis. Teine tulemus oli see, et altkäemaksu 
tajutav ulatus ja altkäemaksu andmise kogemus on positiivselt seotud ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusega. Kui esimene keskendub tajudele, siis teine kogemustele. 
Võimalik seletus võiks olla see, et kui juhid tajuvad, et riigis, kus nad tegutsevad, 
on korruptsioon laialt levinud probleem, leiavad nad kohe võimalusi vastuta-
vatele inimestele altkäemaksu maksta. Võiks öelda, et juhid maksavad mitte-
ametlikke makseid, kuna nad usuvad, et need kindla peale kiirendavad tehinguid. 
See väitekiri liigub nüüd edasi arutelu juurde, mis puudutab võimalikke poliitilisi 
tagajärgi ja esitab korruptsioonivastased strateegiad korruptsiooni ennetamiseks. 
Kokkuvõttes on käesoleva väitekirja empiiriliste uuringute tulemused esi-
tanud erasektorilt erasektorile ja erasektorilt avalikule sektorile suunatud korrupt-
sioonist erinevaid aspekte. I uurimus heitis valgust juhtide otsustusprotsessile 
erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsioonis, samal ajal kui II uurimus aitab meil 
mõista erasektorilt avalikule sektorile suunatud korruptsioonile eelnenud juhtide 
kaalutlustest. Need kaks uurimust koos moodustavad esimese poole väitekirja 
uurimisplaanist, keskendudes sellele, kuidas on juhid korruptsiooniga seotude. 
Teises pooles, III ja IV uurimuses keskenduti peamiselt korruptsiooni võima-
likele tagajärgedele ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele. III uurimus rikastab olemas-
olevaid teadmisi korruptsioonist, tutvustades omanditüübi ja riigi tasandil esi-
neva korruptsiooni olulisust korruptiivsetes suhetes. IV uurimus tõstis esile eri-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Käesoleva väitekirja tulemused annavad mitmeid praktilisi soovitusi ettevõtete 
juhtidele ja poliitikakujundajatele, kes soovivad korruptsiooniga võidelda. 
Arvestama peaks aga sellega, et korruptsiooni vastu võitlemine ei ole lihtne, see 
eeldab interdistsiplinaarset lähenemist ja lähenemisviis „üks suurus sobib 
kõigile“ (one-size-fits-all) ei pruugi olla õige (Teichmann, 2018). Kuigi uuri-
mustes leidub üksikasjalikke praktilisi soovitusi, on mõned neist järgnevalt 
esitatud kokkuvõtlikul kujul. 
 
1. See väitekiri rõhutab juhtide kulude-tulude analüüsi ja moraalsete hinnangute 
rolli kaalutlustes korruptsiooniga tegemist teha ning väidab, et moraalsed 
hinnangud võiksid olla olulised, et vähendada juhtide kalduvust osaleda 
korruptsioonis. Niisiis võivad korruptsioonivastased meetmed ettevõtetes olla 
kavandatud nii, et need oleksid suunatud korruptsiooni moraalsetele aspek-
tidele, võimalikele korruptsiooniga seotud kuludele, sealhulgas ettevõtte 
mainekahjule konkreetseid tegusid tehes. Sest inimesed ei pruugi olla korrupt-
sioonist informeeritud ega teadlikud korruptsiooni seaduslikest tagajärgedest 
(Becker et al., 2013). Hauser (2019) esitas tõendid selle kohta, et korrupt-
sioonivastase koolituse läbinud ettevõtlusspetsialistidel on suurem tõenäosus 
hüljata korruptiivse tegevuse õigustused kui neil, kes pole sellist koolitust 
läbinud. Seesugused koolitused võiksid alata juba enne tööelu kõrghariduse 
omandamise ajal. Kõrgkoolid peaksid integreerima korruptsioonivastase 
võitluse kursused ülikooli õppekavadesse (Becker et al., 2013). See strateegia 
võib aidata korruptsiooni ennetada ja korruptiivset käitumist takistada, kui 
tulevastest otsustajatest saavad tegelikud otsustajad ja ettevõtlusspetsialistid. 
2. Väitekiri rõhutab, et uuendusmeelsed ja riski armastavad juhid seovad end 
korruptsiooniga tõenäolisemalt. Sisuliselt on need juhiomadused, mis on 
olulised, et firmat saadaks edu. Juhid on majandusele orienteeritud, nad tahaksid 
saavutada seda, mis on ettevõttele parim. Korruptsioonivastaseid meetmeid ei 
oleks mõistlik kavandada uuendusmeelsete ja riski armastavate juhtide vastu, 
seetõttu, et nad annavad suurema tõenäosusega altkäemaksu. Arukas soovitus 
oleks selline, et valitsustel oleks vajalik arendada selliseid institutsioone, mis 
rahuldaksid ettevõtjate vajadusi ja hõlbustaks ettevõtlust. Sest juhid eelistavad 
maksta mitteametlikke makse bürokraatlike takistuste eemaldamiseks ja 
arengumaade tehingute kiirendamiseks. Ilma efektiivsete institutsioonideta 
püsib korruptsioon kui üks äritegevuse viise. Kui need institutsioonid on 
asutatud, ei raiska juhid oma ressursse korruptsioonile, vaid viljakatele 
toimingutele. 
3. Käwsolev väitekiri on näidanud, et välismaiste omanikega ettevõtted kanna-
tavad tõenäoliselt enam korruptsiooni all kui kodumaiste omanikega ette-
võtted, eriti kõrge korruptiivsusega riikides. Rahvusvahelised ettevõtted sei-
savad sageli silmitsi korruptsiooni või sellega seotud probleemidega riikides, 
kus institutsionaalne keskkond on nõrk, ja on võimalik, et bürokraatlike 
ettekirjutuste ületamiseks peavad nad maksma altkäemaksu. Seesuguste 
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probleemide ennetamiseks on rahvusvaheline üldsus võtnud kasutusele uued 
konventsioonid7. Nendele pingutustele vaatamata on korruptsiooni tasemes 
positiivseid muutusi näha harva. Sellest lähtudes peaksid korrumpeerunud 
riikide valitsused kutsuma ellu korruptsioonivastaseid meetmeid, tugevdades 
korruptsioonivastast õiguskaitset ja säilitades omandiõiguse kaitse, et saada 
välismaiseid otseinvesteeringuid ja luua puhas ärikeskkond kodumaistele 
ettevõtetele. 
4. Üldiselt leitakse, et altkäemaksud halvendavad ettevõtte tulemuslikkust. Samuti 
võib suurema korruptsiooni tulemuseks olla suurem arv regulatsioone ja 
protseduure, aga lihtsam ja vähema bürokraatiaga ning suurema läbipaist-
vusega olukord tooks kaasa korruptsiooni vähenemise (Sharma ja Mitra, 
2015). Riigiametnike kahtlaste menetlusnõuete, nagu näiteks eraisikute ja 
ettevõtete lisadokumentide vähendamiseks oleks abiks e-süsteemi paigalda-
mine, nt e-valitsemine aitaks suurendada suhtluse ja tehingute läbipaistvust 
ning vastutust ja jälgitavust (Ionescu, 2016). Kuid läbipaistvusest ei pruugi 
korruptsiooni peatamiseks piisata (Kolstad ja Wiig, 2009), seda tuleb täien-
dada muude poliitika vormide ja muudatustega. Näiteks Kim et al. (2009) 
väidavad, et IKT (Information and communications technology) tõhus kasuta-
mine korruptsiooni ohjeldamiseks vajab lisaks ka tõhusat poliitilist juhtimist, 
kavandamaks ja rakendamaks poliitikat, et teha kindlaks, kas investeeringud 
on ikka tõhusalt eraldatud. 
5. Selles väitekirjas leiti, et bürokraatlik ja poliitiline korruptsioon on ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusega positiivselt seotud. See ei tähenda, et see oleks ettevõtetele 
ja turule üldises mõttes kasulik. Kuna bürokraatlikku ja poliitilist korrupt-
siooni liigitatakse kõrgetasemeliseks korruptsiooniks ja ettevõtted seovad end 
sellise korruptsiooniga konkurentsieelise või riigihankelepingute saamiseks, 
maksudest kõrvale hoidmiseks ja tehingutega seotud kulude vähendamiseks. 
Sellest tulenevalt võivad need kahjustada konkurentsi ja pikaajaliselt ei pruugi 
need teenida head eesmärki. Seetõttu peaksid poliitika tegijad kavandama 
korruptsioonivastast poliitikat, mis ei julgustaks ettevõtteid ja poliitikas osa-
lejaid korruptsiooni nimel koostööd tegema. 
 
 
Tulevaste uurimuste kitsendused ja võimalused 
Selle väitekirja moodustavatel uurimustel on ka omad puudused. Selle alapeatüki 
all arutlen nende uurimustega seotud piirangute üle. Eeldades, et need puudused 
ei mõjuta selle töö järelduste usaldusväärsust ja kindlust, tuleb töö tulemusi 
                                                                          
7  Näiteks on Ameerika Ühendriigid loonud akti „The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act“ (FCPA) 
võitlemaks üleilmse ärilise korruptsiooniga. Sarnaselt lõi OECD 1999. aastal konventsiooni 
„Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions“, mis välistab liikmesriikide ettevõtete välismaistele ametnikele altkäemaksu 
maksmise (Wu, 2006). Samamoodi loodi 2002. aastal „Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption“ ja 2005. aastal kutsuti ellu „United Nations Convention against 
Corruption“, et korruptsiooni ennetada (Argandoña, 2007; Hauser ja Hogenacker, 2014). 
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tõlgendades neile tähelepanu pöörata. Sellest lähtuvalt pakutakse edaspidiseks 
uurimistööks mitmeid ettepanekuid. 
Kõigi korruptsiooniga seotud uurimuste ja ka käesolevas väitekirjas kasutatud 
uurimuste probleemiks on see, et nad on enesearuandluse/arvamusküsitluse tüüpi 
(self-reported surveys). Vaatamata selle headele külgedele on enesearuandluse 
kui meetodi puudused eriti suured just ebaeetilise käitumise uurimisel. See on 
puudus ka I uurimuse puhul. Teine uurimuse puudus on see, et andmete kogumise 
meetodiks oli telefoniintervjuu ja seda, kas vastajad said küsimustest või teemadest 
täpselt aru, ei õnnestu tõestada/kontrollida. I uurimuse viimane puudus on see, et 
andmestik pärineb ainult kahest riigist, nii et andmeid saab parimal juhul võrrelda 
väikeste Euroopa riikidega, kuid mitte kogu ärimaailmaga. Samuti peetakse neid 
kahte riiki arenenud riikideks ja nad on rahvusvaheliselt tunnustatud korruptsiooni 
edetabelis kõrgetel kohtadel. Seega on ettepanekud järgmisteks uuringuteks järg-
mised. Vaatamata andmete kogumisega seotud üldistele väljakutsetele tuleks 
andmeid koguda telefoniintervjuude asemel muudel andmekogumise meetoditel, 
näiteks intervjueeritavatega kohtudes. See suurendaks empiirilises analüüsis 
kasutatud andmete usaldusväärsust. Sarnaseid uuringuid võib korrata suurema 
hulga erinevate sektorite ja eri riikide ettevõtlusspetsialistide valimiga. Eriti selleks, 
et laiendada oma teadmisi ja mitte piirata oma teadmisi korruptsioonist kui ainult 
erasektorilt avaliku sektori suunal toimuvast, vajab erasektorilt erasektorile 
korruptsioon suuremat tähelepanu. Erilist tähelepanu võiks pöörata juhtide ja 
ettevõtlusspetsialistide käitumisele erasektorilt erasektorile korruptsioonis väga 
korrumpeerunud riikides. See võimaldab meil rohkem teada saada nende korrupt-
sioonitegude taga olevate otsuste põhjustest, kõrge korruptsiooniga ärikeskkonnas. 
Ka II uurimusel on mitmeid puudusi. Esiteks kasutab see ristandmeid, seega 
tasuks ettevaatlik olla vaadeldava mustri tõlgendamisel põhjuslikuna. Sellegi-
poolest võib sellistel suhetel olla seoseid põhjuslikkusega. Näiteks võib väita, et 
korrumpeerunud käitumine on ajas väga stabiilne, nii et riigis, kus korruptsioon 
on laialt levinud nähtus, ei pruugi lühikese aja jooksul toimuda suuri muutusi. 
Selle uurimuse teine puudus seisneb selles, et uurimus tugines ainult ühe riigi 
empiirilisel analüüsil, milleks oli Vietnam. Kuna Vietnamil on spetsiifiline äri-
kliima, kus on erinev kultuuriline keskkond ja keerulised inimeste vahelised 
suhted, võivad juhtide iseloomujooned ja juhiomadused Vietnamis olla ka eri-
nevalt kujunenud. Konkreetsed juhiomadused, mil on korruptsioonile ja ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkusele mõju, võivad riikides, kus altkäemaks on vähem levinud ja 
ühiskond ei aktsepteeri seda, erineda. Seega võivad tulevased uurimused püüda 
vältida eespool nimetatud puudusi, kuigi see on vähetõenäoline, sest puuduseks 
on andmete ja riigi olemus. Ehkki rikkaliku ja usaldusväärse andmestiku leidmine 
on keeruline, võivad tulevased teadlased kasutada näiteks mitme riigi pika-
ajaliselt kogutud andmeid. See uuring pani Vietnami keskmesse. Tulevased uuri-
mused võivad uurida juhtide omaduste ja korruptsiooni suhet arenenud maade ja 
teiste arengumaade kontekstis.  
III ja IV uurimuses kasutatakse sama andmestikku, mis on BEEPS’i rist-
andmete uuring. Seetõttu seisneb mõlema uuringu ja ka muude sarnast metoo-
dikat kasutavate tööde üldine miinus selles, et igasugune korruptsiooni uurimine 
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ettevõtte tasandil on ebatäiuslik. Kuna korruptsioon on salajase iseloomuga ja 
tegemist on ebaseadusliku tegevusega, on korruptsiooni täpse mõõtmise saavuta-
mine keeruline. Tulevastes uuringutes võiks kaaluda selle uurimuse eespool 
nimetatud probleeme ja korrata sarnast analüüsi, kasutades paneel-andmekogu ja 
vähem tajupõhiseid uuringuid. Teiseks miinuseks oli see, et korruptsiooni mõju 
majandustulemustele võib lühi- ja pikaajaliselt erineda. Ehkki ettevõtted võivad 
lühikese aja jooksul korruptsiooni ära kasutada, võib pikas perspektiivis korrupt-
sioon kahjustada ettevõtete tegevust. Kuna see uuring piirdub BEEPS’i andmete 
olemuse tõttu läbilõike analüüsiga, ei olnud võimalik mõõta korruptsiooni lühi-
ajalisi ja pikaajalisi tagajärgi ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele. Edasistes uuringutes 
võidakse uurida korruptsiooni lühiajalist ja pikaajalist mõju ettevõtte tulemus-
likkusele, kasutades paneel-andmekogu, kui see muutub kättesaadavaks. 
Viimasena, kuid siiski olulisena, tuleb öelda, et selle väitekirja puuduseks 
võib olla erinevate riikide erinevate andmekogude kasutamine. Näiteks II uuri-
mus on ainult ühe riigi, Vietnami, analüüs. Kuid üksiku riigi analüüs võimaldab 
tulevikus teadlastel põhjalikult analüüsida korruptsiooni ja ühe riigi analüüsi saab 
kasutada tulevaste võrdlevate analüüside teekaardina. Lisaks on Eesti (I uuri-
mus), Vietnam (II uurimus) ja enamik BEEPS´i uuringus osalenud riike (III ja IV 
uurimus) kogenud kommunistlikku režiimi. Eeldatakse, et see ühine omadus 
suurendab võrreldavust ja võimalust kõiki tulemusi ühte süsteemi paigutada. See-
suguste uuringute leiud teiste riikide kohta, millel on erinev ajalooline, kultuuri-
line ja institutsionaalne taust, võivad erineda. Sestap laiendaksid tulevased uurin-
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